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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

As a matter of law and undisputed fact, did the plaintiffs (the "Smiths") suffer

any damages that were caused by the alleged breaches of contract and breaches of fiduciary
duty on the part of the defendants ("Fairfax") where Fairfax took the only alternative
available to save the property at issue in this case from a total loss—contributing the
property to a real estate investment trust ("REIT")?l
Standard of Review: In reviewing the Trial Court's denial of a motion for a
directed verdict, this Court reviews "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may
fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [the Smiths], and will sustain the
denial if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a
verdict." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ]|16, 990 P.2d 933.
II.

Did the Trial Court err in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury

in the absence of evidence that Fairfax willfully and deliberately disregarded the rights of
the Smiths in a way that proximately caused injury?2
Issue preserved at R 1736-39 (summary judgment motion); 4538 at 4-9, 55-56 (oral
argument and ruling); 3202-03 (ruling); 1706-08, 3116-19 (motion in limine re: REIT
damages); 1922-2009, 3129-32 (motion in limine re: Howden); 2013-19, 3120-28
(motion in limine re: Norman); 4538 at 56 (oral argument); 3201-04 (ruling); 4545 at
1002-08 (directed verdict motion); 4545 at 1014 (ruling); 4551 at 2034 (directed verdict
motion); 4551 at 2035 (ruling); 4551 at 2132 (instruction objections); 3754-63, 3782-88,
4265-80 (j.n.o.v. motion); 4508 (ruling).
2

Issue preserved at R 4545 at 1002-05 (directed verdict motion); 4545 at 1014 (ruling);
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 1
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Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of whether sufficient evidence
has been shown to submit a claim of punitive damages to a jury is a question of law,
reviewed by courts de novo. See Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 170 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1999).
III.

Was the jury's punitive damage award excessive?3

Standard of Reviews The Trial Court's decision in this regard is reviewed for
correctness and is given no deference. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001
UT 89, If 13, 15, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44.
IV.

Did the Trial Court err in submitting the issue of prejudgment interest to the

jury and in entering a judgment including prejudgment interest; alternatively, was the
evidence sufficient to support the amount of the jury's award of prejudgment interest?
Standard of Review: Entitlement to prejudgment interest is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^[73, 5 P.3d 616. Evidence is
insufficient to support a verdict "if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the appellant demonstrates that the findings lack substantial evidentiary
support." Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, T[15, 48 P.3d 888.

4541 at 2034 (directed verdict motion); 4541 at 2035 (ruling); 4551 at 2133, 2139
(instruction objections); 3754-67, 3782-88, 4265-80 (j.n.o.v. motion); 4508 (ruling).
3

Issue preserved at R 3738-3811, 4157-262 (motion for new trial or remittitur); 4553 at
3-27, 55-58 (oral argument); 4509-10 (ruling); 4352-4407, 4469-75 (special finding
objections); 4510 (ruling); 4493-98 (special findings).

4

Issue preserved at R 1709-15, 3207-24 (motion in limine); 4538 at 61-65, 68 (oral
argument); 3511-12 (ruling); 4539 at 92-99 (trial argument and ruling); 4551 at 2132,
2137, 2139 (instruction objections); 3720 (Instruction No. 44); 3799-3801, 4168-69
(motion for new trial or remittitur); 4553 at 28 (argument); 4509-10 (ruling).

2
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes whose interpretation is
determinative or of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This case is a business dispute between partners regarding actions taken to save an

insolvent New Mexico shopping mall (the "Mall") from imminent foreclosure. As the only
alternative to avoid such foreclosure or bankruptcy, the appellant, Fairfax Realty, Inc.
("Fairfax"), the general partner of two limited partnerships (the "Partnerships"), conveyed
the Mall to a Real Estate Investment Trust ("REIT") that Fairfax was creating for other
properties in which it owned an interest in exchange for shares in the REIT.
The plaintiffs (the "Smiths"), who are limited partners holding a 15% interest in the
Partnerships, complained that Fairfax breached the partnership agreements by contributing
the Mall to the REIT without obtaining the Smiths' consent and without obtaining fair
market, appraised value for the Mall. The Smiths also asserted that Fairfax breached its
fiduciary duty as a general partner by engaging in "self-dealing" and by failing to disclose
infomiation regarding the REIT. Finally, the Smiths alleged that, inasmuch as Fairfax had
breached its contractual and fiduciary duties, the contribution of the Mall to the REIT
constituted conversion. However, the Smiths offered no evidence of any alternative course
to save the Mall from foreclosure or bankruptcy. Rather, the Smiths merely assumed that
the Mall could somehow have been sold for its fair market, appraised value prior to
foreclosure despite five years of unsuccessful attempts to do so.

3
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The Smiths also alleged that they were entitled to punitive damages, arguing that
Fairfax misled them into thinking they had several options with respect to the REIT (while
unilaterally deciding to proceed with the REIT), that Fairfax failed to disclose information
about the REIT, that Fairfax's management fee was too high, that Fairfax selectively
accrued interest on the partners' loans to the Partnerships, and that Fairfax wrongfully
combined bank accounts, including those of the Partnerships.
After a fourteen-day trial, the jury awarded the Smiths $410,000 in compensatory
damages. The jury also awarded $690,000 for prejudgment interest damages—$92,000
more than the amount for which the Smiths presented evidence. The jury then awarded
$5,500,000 in punitive damages.
In response to Fairfax's post-trial motions, the Trial Court entered judgment on the
jury verdict, affirmed the prejudgment interest award, and, without referencing the
controlling factors announced by this Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d
789 (Utah 1991) ("Crookston I") to justify the excessive punitive damages award, affimied
the punitive damage award.
II.

Facts
1.

Creation of the Partnerships. In the early 1980s, Fairfax (then known as Price

Development Company) purchased a 33-acre parcel in Clovis, New Mexico, from Armand
Smith ("Smith") and others, in exchange for $2 million and a 15% interest in two limited
partnerships—North Plains Development Company, Ltd. and North Plains Land Company,
Ltd. (the "Partnerships"), which were to build and operate a shopping center (the "Mall") on

4
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the land.5 (R 4541 at 403-04; 4549 at 1809-10.) A copy of one of the two (substantially
identical) partnership agreements is included in the Addendum at Tab L.
2.

Construction and Operation of Mall. The Mall was constructed with a

$9 million interim loan from Wells Fargo Realty Advisors. (D-256; R 4549 at 1812.) In
October 1989, that loan was paid with the proceeds of a $12 million short-term loan from
Chemical Bank, which matured in October 1991. (D-272; D-279; R 4545 at 1059.)
After the Mall opened in October 1985, it soon experienced operating deficits for a
variety of reasons. (R 4539 at 199; P-34.) In order to fund those operating deficits and to
finance additional construction, a "capital call"

was made on the partners in December

Fairfax had a 5% general partner interest in the Partnerships. The remaining interests
were allocated to limited partners as follows: Smith and related trusts (15%), Fairfax
(15%), John Price—the principal of Fairfax—and related trusts (55%), and NP
Investment Company—consisting of persons related to Fairfax (10%). (P-15 at art. 4.)
Thereafter, Smith conveyed a portion of his interest to Virginia Smith, as part of a divorce.
(P-56.) Armand and Virginia Smith will be collectively referred to as "the Smiths." The
Smiths stipulated at trial that Smith was the agent of his former wife with respect to the
Partnerships. (R4549 at 1850-59, 1862.)
A number of contract provisions in the partnership agreements were in dispute at trial.
However, because damages were awarded on non-contract claims and because of space
limitations in this brief, Fairfax will not address arguments that relate solely to the
breach-of-contract claims. To the extent necessaiy to provide context, Fairfax will
address specific contract provisions at relevant places below.
Under the partnership agreements, "capital contributions" were placed in "separate
capital accounts for each Partner,'1 and did not accme interest. (P-15 at section 4.) After
the initial capital contributions, the Mall was to be constructed and operated out of, first,
construction and permanent financing and operating revenues, second, interim "gap"
loans, and, if necessary, third, through loans from or "capital calls" on each partner in
proportion to their ownership. (Id. at §§ 8.2, 9.4.) However, such loans could be repaid
by the Partnerships only out of "net spendable income" after (1) payment of operating
expenses, (2) payment of due loan payments, and (3) "adequate provision" for "working
capital requirements." (Id. at § 9.3.) For a period of time, Fairfax's internal accounting for
the Partnerships accrued (but did not pay) interest on Fairfax's capital call but not on the
5
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1989—51,294,210 from Fairfax and $228,390 from the Smiths. (P-34.) In addition, to
cover the Partnerships' continuing operating deficits, Fairfax thereafter obtained "gap loans"
in accordance with Section 9.2(a) and (b) of the partnership agreements, of approximately
$1.5 million from its own bank line and advanced those funds as a loan to the Partnerships.8
(R 4545 at 1115-16; 4550 at 1911-12; D-282).
3.

Fairfax's Efforts to Refinance or Sell the Mall. Beginning in 1988, Fairfax

undertook substantial efforts through its primary financing sources and through a national
broker, Sonnenblick-Goldman, to secure a permanent loan or other financing arrangements,
including a possible sale9 of the Mall. (R 4545 at 1061-62; 4548 at 1592-94; 4550 at 189899,1914,1929.) In June 1991, as the maturity of the Chemical Bank loan approached,
Fairfax engaged another national broker, Cushman & Wakefield, to seek other financing

Smiths' capital call. In the end, neither Fairfax nor the Smiths were paid back their capital
calls or interest thereon, and the interest was backed out. (R 4544 at 921, 923, 937; 4548 at
1684-85, 1772-73; 4550 at 2002-03.) The Smiths never established that any other treatment
of these contributions would have resulted in any more value to the Smiths under the REIT.
o

The Smiths claimed that such loans violated the partnership agreements because the
Smiths were not given "notice" of these allegedly "significant borrowings." (R 4541 at
416-18; see also P-15 at § 4.5.) Fairfax claimed that it did not view such gap loans as
"significant borrowings," and, in any event, such loans were shown on the Partnerships'
operating statements given to the Smiths. (R 4541 at 425; 4550 at 1897.) The gap loans
accrued interest at the rate charged to Fairfax by its bank, rather than the higher interest
rate applicable to "capital calls." (R 4545 at 1060, 1115-16.)
9
The Smiths pointed out that a cash sale of the Mall could have resulted in adverse tax
consequences to Price (not relevant to the REIT) so that he allegedly had a disincentive to
try to sell the Mall. (R 4547 at 1571, 1578; 4550 at 1988-89.) However, the undisputed
testimony was that such tax impacts were not a consideration during this process, (R
4550 at 1989), and that such a sale probably would not have resulted in the mentioned tax
consequences, (R 4550 at 2021).

6
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arrangements or a sale to pay off the Chemical Bank loan.

(R 4546 at 1243; 4548 at 1599-

1600, 1613-15; 4550 at 1932-33; D-51, D-322, D-314). Cushman & Wakefield presented
the Mall to over fifty national lenders and potential buyers through 1992. (R 4548 at 1601,
1604-05, 1622; D-51; D-322; D-337 (written summary of efforts).) However, by this time,
the national permanent financing and real estate markets had virtually "collapsed,"11
(R 4541 at 530; 4545 at 1049-50, 1066-68, 1076, 1174-75; 4546 at 1275-76; 4548 at 15991600, 1635; 4555 at 1891-93), and coupled with certain cash flow limitations on the Mall,
all of the efforts to finance or sell the Mall were unsuccessful,12 (R 4548 at 1595-99; D-322,
D-337). The Smiths did not criticize the reasonableness or effectiveness of the specific
efforts made by Fairfax to refinance or sell the Mall.
Fairfax sought and successfully arranged five short-term extensions of the Chemical
Bank loan from 1991 to July 1993 to permit it to seek other financing or a buyer—the

As part of this process, the Partnerships had the Mall appraised in mid-1992 at $15
million. (R 4543 at 662.)
11

Smith testified that the New Mexico real estate market did not experience a downturn
at that time, (R 4519 at 428-29), and the Smiths' expert testified that the market was
"showing signs of doing well; not great, but well," (R 4542 at 632). The precise
characterization of the New Mexico market at that time is not critical because of Fairfax's
actual unsuccessful attempts to refinance or sell the Mall in that market. (D-337
(identifying efforts directed at regional lenders/buyers).)
19

Andrew Oliver of Cushman & Wakefield testified that only one institutional lender
(Allstate) actively considered refinancing and even this was only at $9 million;
furthermore, Allstate's formal offer dropped to $6 million. (R 4548 at 1604; D-339.) In
August 1992, Mr. Oliver wrote to Fairfax that, although his efforts were continuing, "it
would be very difficult to obtain a mortgage with a loan amount exceeding $9 million."
(D-337.) By December 1992 he had "exhausted all the avenues and there was basically
no one interested in buying the property or in arranging financing." (R 4548 at 1603-04.)
Mr. Oliver testified that the situation did not improve until after 1994 (more than a year
after the REIT transaction). (R 4548 at 1604-05.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law7
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conditions for each succeeding extension, however, becoming increasingly burdensome.
(R 4550 at 1913-15; D-356; see also R 4545 at 1065-66.) Upon expiration of the fifth
extension in July 1993, Chemical Bank served a notice of default and demanded payment in
full of the $11.3 million loan balance. (R 4545 at 1106-07; D-354.) In September 1993,
Fairfax was able to negotiate a sixth and final extension (through July 15, 1994) on the basis
that it was working to organize a REIT to pay off the loan. (R 4545 at 1175.) But for the
prospect of conveying the Mall to the REIT, the sixth extension would not have been
granted. (R 4545 at 1075.) Most importantly, Chemical Bank told Fairfax that there were
to be no further extensions.13 (R 4545 at 1069-70,1073.)
Unable to refinance or sell the Mall and unable to pay the Chemical Bank loan, the
Partnerships faced imminent foreclosure or bankruptcy. (R 4545 at 1089, 1107; 4548 at
1719-20; 4550 at 1914,1922-23.) The Smiths presented no evidence that they could have
gotten fair market value (or any return on investment) for the Mall in foreclosure or
bankruptcy. However, Fairfax established that foreclosure or bankruptcy would have had
the following serious adverse consequences to all of the partners, including the Smiths:
(1) the partners' investment in the Mall would be lost, (R 4542 at 613-14; 4545 at 1088;
13

Thomas Matesich of Chemical Bank testified that in light of the fact that the permanent
financing market had "evaporated" and the bank's July 1991 merger with another bank
having a large real estate portfolio, Chemical Bank had issued "strict mandates to reduce
our portfolio as quickly and efficiently as possible without suffering significant losses,"
that the bank's "strategy was not necessarily to work with borrowers but to try to get
them off the books," and that the bank was "not of the mind-set to extend maturities
beyond a certain point in time if we thought. . . there was an opportunity for borrowers to
either dispose of the asset or repay the obligation through other financial means." (R
4548 at 1635-37, 1639, 1643.)

8 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4548 at 1719-24); (2) the partners would incur depreciation recapture tax liability, (R 4545
at 1088, 1132); and (3) the partners, including Smith, could incur liability on their personal
guarantees of the Chemical Bank loan, (R 4541 at 435). Faced with this dire situation and
believing it had no other alternatives, Fairfax pursued the only course then available—
inclusion of the Mall in a REIT then being considered by Fairfax for other Fairfax
properties14 (due to recent changes in the law). (R 4545 at 1082, 1089, 1097; 4546 at 1235;
4550 at 1923, 1986.)
4.

Preparation of the REIT Transaction. Fairfax hired nationally recognized

attorneys and brokers to advise it with respect to creating the REIT. (R 4541 at 507, 606;
4545 at 1092, 1094, 1097-99; 4546 at 1291-94, 1301.) The goal of Fairfax and its
professional advisors was to obtain the highest values available for the properties
contributed to the REIT, including the Mall. (R 4541 at 606; 4545 at 1083-87, 1100-01;
4546 at 1231, 1328-29.) Although the Smiths objected to not using appraisals for the REIT

The Smiths repeatedly pointed to the benefits that Price and/or Fairfax received from
the REIT due to their ownership of other properties as evidence of alleged "self-dealing,"
and the Smiths argued that Fairfax did not disclose facts to the Smiths because it "did not
want the Smiths to interfere by filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit when the
REIT was created." (R 4551 at 2056.) Such arguments are unfounded because it was
undisputed at trial that Fairfax could have gone ahead with the REIT for these other
properties without the Mall—although to the detriment of the Partnerships. (See R 4545
at 1123; 4550 at 1921-22.) It was also undisputed that although Price personally
benefited from the REIT, (P-71 at 8-9 (Prospectus); R 4542 at 615-18), he would have
received those same benefits (or even more) from the REIT if the Mall had not been
contributed to the REIT. (R 4545 at 1117-18, 1123-24, 1129-36; 4546 at 1288-90, 132728; 4550 at 1921-22, 1949-50, 1958-61, 1948.) Consequently, there can be no argument
that Fairfax contributed the Mall to the REIT to obtain any personal benefit, but Fairfax
acted only to benefit the Partnerships.

9
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valuation,I5 (R 4540 at 288-90, 343, 363), Fairfax relied on the advice of the professionals
that such values should be determined by a uniform method acceptable to investors and
typically used for REIT transactions, rather than individualized real estate appraisals, which
tend to vary from appraiser to appraiser. (R 4545 at 1094-94, 1099,1127-28, 1150-52,
1163-64; 4546 at 1291-96.)
In a July 19, 1993 telephone conversation, Fairfax representatives discussed with
Smith their efforts "to secure additional financing to replace the Chemical Bank loan," the
"difficulty in refinancing all of [Fairfax's malls], not just [the Mall]," and that Fairfax was
considering the possibility of creating a REIT, of which the Mall would be a small part.
(R 4540 at 263-71, 476,486, 487; 4545 at 1083-84; P-57 (Smith's notes).) Smith
expressed concern about what would happen to his interest in such a transaction. (R 4540 at
265.) According to Smith, he was told by Fairfax that he had three "options": (1) "buy out
1:>

The use of the REIT method of valuation was the Smiths' main point of dispute.
Although both appraisers and REIT valuators start with capitalized net operating income,
a REIT valuation requires a further deduction of the costs of the REIT from the Mall's
operating income. The Smiths' damage expert, Merrill Norman, succinctly summarized
his objections to the REIT accounting as follows: "[W]e should be valuing this property
irrespective of how it gets financed in the future. . . . The fallacy of this method is that
this method tries to measure some type of value, REIT value, after the REIT is put in
place. And many of these costs here didn't exist before the REIT was established. They
are either in conjunction with the establishment of the REIT, or . . . with the new debt
associated with refinancing through the REIT. . .. But the fair approach is to value this
without regard to what might happen to the REIT and back up in time to come up with
fair market value before the REIT expenses are treated at all. . . . I'm not trying to be a
lawyer, counsel. But I understand the measure's fair market value as the parties find
themselves. . . . We need not get into the REIT as an alternative solution." (R. 4543 at
780; 4544 at 467, 973, 975.) Although Norman considered value "as the parties find
themselves," he attributed no cost or other negative effect on value resulting from
Chemical Bank's notice of default.
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my interest" based on a formula, (2) "contribute [Fairfax's] 85 percent... to the REIT and
you would be a partner with the REIT," or (3) "contribute the entire property and . . . give
you stock in the REIT." (R 4540 at 269-71; P-57.) Although there was a dispute over what
Fairfax representatives said to Smith, (R 4540 at 476-77; 4545 at 1078-79), it is undisputed
that in the end the Smiths were not given the three options because the entire Mall propeity
had to be transferred to the REIT in order to pay the Chemical Bank loan. (R 4545 at 110708; 4550 at 1920-21.)
In September 1993, Fairfax continued preparation for a REIT transaction. Fairfax
formed JP Realty, Inc., a Maryland corporation, which would be the "trust1' entity, and Price
Development Company, a Maryland limited partnership, of which JP Really was the general
partner, which would hold the properties. (R 4541 at 497-98; see also P-58; P-163 at 3.)
A Contribution Agreement, by which the Mall woi-ld be transferred to the REIT at
the time of and conditioned upon the REIT's closing, was also signed by Fairfax on
September 13, 1993, in anticipation of the REIT.16 (P-58, 59.) At trial, the Smiths
complained that the Contribution Agreement should have been disclosed to the Smiths, and
such nondisclosure was used by the Trial Court to justify the award of punitive damages in
this case. (R 4840 at 281, 285, 300, 361; 4494-95.) However, it was undisputed that
Fairfax relied en the advice of counsel that the securities laws precluded it from making an
earlier disclosure to the Smiths. (R 454J at 507, 521; 4545 at 1103-04; 4546 at 1233; 4550
at 1920, 1994-97.)
16

A "preliminary prospectus" for the REIT at $22.50 per share was filed with the SEC on
or about September 15, 1993. (P-163.) However, that sale failed to close.
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In October 1993, Smith agreed (allegedly at Fairfax's request) to transfer the
Partnership interests held in trust for his children to himself "because of some technicality"
relative to the REIT transaction. (R 4540 at 278; 4541 at 431-32.)
In approximately November 1993, Fairfax called Smith to provide "an update" and
to see if Smith "thought much about what they talked about in connection with the REIT."17
(R 4540 at 277-78.) On November 17, 1993, Smith wrote to Fairfax requesting information
that he needed to "make a decision on your question concerning the contribution of
partnership interest to the REIT." (P-62; R 4540 at 275.) Smith wanted information
regarding the "value of my equity interest" and whether his "loan to the partnership [will] be
paid" with interest, and further whether "other partnership loans have been periodically
paid" while he had received no payments. (P-62.) On November 22, 1993, Fairfax told
Smith that it was "still working on some of the valuation issues," and would call Smith to
"go over the questions you ask in your letter." (D-366.)
On December 1, 1993, Fairfax and Smith again talked by telephone. Fairfax then
faxed to Smith "an estimate," dated November 29, 1993, showing an "Estimated Total
Partnership Units" of 9,628. (P-64; R 4540 at 286-88.) On December 2, 1993, Fairfax sent
to Smith audited financial statements for the Partnerships, which "whether right or wrong"
showed the capital calls as "capital contributions," and further explained Fairfax's

17

Amended preliminary prospectuses for a REIT at $22.00 per share were filed with the
SEC on November 15 and 18, 1993. (P-164 and 165.) A further amended preliminary
prospectus at $19.00 per share was filed on November 30, 1993. (P-166.) These sales
failed to close at these prices.

12 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

subsequent gap loans to finance operating deficits. (P-65.) That letter also outlined
Fairfax's unsuccessful attempts to refinance or sell the Mall:
As you may be aware, we have tried several different approaches to refinance or sell
the property. To date we have not found an acceptable buyer willing to pay a
reasonable price for the property or a lender that would loan sufficient funds that
would not require at least an additional infusion of cash ($3.0 to $4.0 million) to pay
off the existing mortgage. None of these options would be acceptable to either one
of us. These facts are what piompted my conversation with you some lime ago as to
whether you might have a group of investors who might be willing to purchase the
property. . . . We feel we still have significant financial exposure relative to this
property. Though we have not seen the increase in value that we would have liked,
we feel the REIT eliminates the potential future exposure with respect to the
property.
(P-65.) On that same evening, Smith called Fairfax and complained that the "estimate" was
not based on "fair market value," and that the estimate showed repayment of an
"intercompany loan" to Fairfax but not to Smith. (R 4540 at 288-98; P-66 (Smith's notes).)
Smith also raised other concerns, such as the fairness of allocating REIT costs to the
Partnerships when part of the REIT funds were to be used to buy out Price's partners in the
Cottonwood Mall. (Id.) Smith claims that he also asked about "what happened to the
[three] options," but that all Fairfax "would talk about [was] their valuation and the number
of units that they thought that I was entitled to in the REIT." (R 4540 at 299.) Smith's other
December attempts to get information were allegedly unsuccessful. (R 4540 at 299-300.)
In January 1994, Smith received the final Prospectus dated January 13, 1904, for the
REIT by express delivery.18 (P-71; R 4540 at 298.) The Prospectus disclosed that the Mall

Amended preliminary prospectuses at $18.25 per share were filed with the SEC on
January 5 and 12, 1994. (P-168 and 169.) The final Prospectus at $17.50 per share was
filed with the SEC on January 13, 1994. (P-71.)
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was to be contributed pursuant to agreement to the REIT, it described the formation of the
REIT, and it disclosed Price's potential conflicts of interest19 in and benefits20 from the
REIT. (P-71 at 2-3, 14-15,25-26,45, 63-64, 90.) Prior to this date, Smith had not been told
about the existence of the Contribution Agreement. (R 4540 at 298-300.) On January 20,
1994, (the day before the REIT closed), Fairfax told Smith that he would get 13,319 units
from the REIT, (D-442; R4549 at 1843, see footnotes 24 and 25, for a calculation of this
number), which at the Prospectus price represented a value of $233,882.50.
Fairfax did not seek the Smiths' consent prior to closing the REIT.21 (R 4540 at 21118.) However, it was uncontested that the Smiths were not asked for their consent because

In particular, the Prospectus disclosed that the contribution of the properties "was not
based on arm's length negotiations between the [property owners] and [the REIT] or on
independent appraisals or valuations of the Properties." (P-71 at 14; see also id. at 2, 26,
63, 64.) However, as was explained by the only REIT expert to testify at trial, the REIT
method of valuation "is dictated by capital markets" based on the "ability [of each
property] to generate cash flow." (R 4546 at 1293.) There really are (and can be) no
"negotiations" at the contribution stage, which is where the alleged conflict of interest
between Price and the Smiths or self-dealing would have occurred, because that
contribution is based on the objective criteria of net operating income. (R 4546 at 1336.)
Based on the reported net operating incomes of the properties, the buying public then
determines how much it is willing to pay for that stream of income, and the property
owners determine whether to accept that price. (R 4546 at 1334-35.) Thus, a REIT is in
essence "an arm's length negotiation dictated by market circumstances" between the
property contributors (represented by Fairfax in this case) and the public investors
(represented by the investment bankers). (R 4546 at 1334-35.)
20

The benefits outlined in the REIT prospectus included a release of his guarantees on
debt from other contributed partnerships, the buy-out of his partners in the Cottonwood
Mall, and the receipt of preferential voting rights. (P-71 at 8-9.)
21

The parties disputed Fairfax's right to enter the REIT under the partnership agreements
without the Smiths' consent. Specifically, the parties disputed whether the contribution
of the Mall to the REIT was a "partnership purpose" under section 7.2, which required
the Smiths' consent before Fairfax could "assign specific Partnership property, for other
than a Partnership purpose." (P-15 § 7.2.) The Smiths contended that, inasmuch as it
14 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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New York counsel advised Fairfax that federal securities laws prevented such disclosure to
the Smiths in this instance and that the partnership agreements did not require the Smiths'
consent. (R 4541 at 502; 4545 at 1092-94, 1105, 1137-40; 4550 at 1997.)
5.

The REIT Closing

The REIT closed on January 21, 1994, and was registered on the New York Stock
Exchange.22 It was undisputed that the REIT generated as much income as was possible.
(R 4546 at 1328.) Thirty-eight properties, including the Mall, from over seventy-five
separate partnerships or entities, were contributed to the REIT in exchange for shares in the
REIT.23 (R4545 at 1164,1226-27, 1232.) None of the other entities or partners ever

was undisputed that the partners did not contemplate a REIT in 1984, but rather
anticipated operating the Mall, (R 4539 at 154; 4542 at 578), the contribution of the Mall
to the REIT could not be a partnership purpose and required their consent. (R 4540 at
211-14.) Fairfax contended that the partnership agreements provided that the
Partnerships' "purpose" included to "deal with" the property, which covers the sale of
part or all of the property, and that the contribution of the Mall to the REIT to avoid
foreclosure or bankruptcy would have been within the scope of that purpose, (P-15 art. 5;
R 3782-87, 4265-262).
99

This offering closed only because Price unilaterally agreed, without effect on any of the
other partners, to dilute his personal interest by several million dollars. (R 4545 at 111213.) The REIT closing attracted approximately 250 record holders and 15,000-18,000
individual investors. (R 4545 at 1095.)
9^

The parties also disputed whether the contribution of the Mall to the REIT constituted a
disposition or sale of "all of the interests in properties acquired by [the Partnerships] and
other investments made by it," thereby causing the dissolution of the Partnerships and
imposing on Fairfax the duty to "sell all of the Partnership assets as promptly as is
consistent with obtaining the fair market value thereof." (P-15 at § 14 (emphasis added).)
The Smiths argued that the Partnerships dissolved, thereby entitling them to the "fair
market value" (as determined by their appraisers). Fairfax contended that the
contribution of the Mall for shares in the REIT was not sale, but only a change from
direct to indirect ownership of the Mall. Fairfax also argued that the REIT shares
constituted "other investments" so that the Partnerships were not dissolved. In any event,
Fairfax argued the Mall could not have been sold for appraised, fair market value prior to
15
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complained about the REIT transaction, even though all were treated essentially the same as
the Smiths. (R 4545 at 1232.)
On or before the closing, the schedules to the Contribution Agreement were changed
to reflect that the Partnerships had been allocated 20,793 REIT shares: 8,793 shares were
allocated to the Partnerships by the underwriters using the standard REIT formula, and Price
personally contributed an additional 12,000 shares to the Partnerships so as to resolve the
Smiths' concerns.24 (P-58 at Ex. B; R 4550 at 1998-2001.) It is undisputed that the Mall
was valued according to traditional REIT standards, except that the Mall's capitalization
rate ("cap rate") used was decreased, thereby increasing the Mall's value in order to

foreclosure or bankruptcy so that the REIT was the only viable alternative to salvage any
value for the Mall. The Trial Court ruled that the partnership agreements were
"ambiguous," (R 3706 (Instruction No. 31)), but then ruled and instructed the jury that
"fair market value" was the only measure of damages, (R 3717 (Instruction No. 41), 3722
(Instruction No. 46)), and that "the fair market value of the partnership property,"
defined to assume "a reasonable length of time for sale," "is the standard upon which to
base the value of the Smiths' partnership interest in connection with the claims," (R 3723
(Instruction No. 47)). These instructions severely undercut Fairfax's argument that the
REIT (a valuation of the Mall under REIT standards) was the only viable alternative
under the circumstances.
24

As is often the case where numbers are involved, the various allocations of REIT units
in this case may become confusing. On December 2, 1993, Fairfax provided an
"estimate" showing that the Partnerships would get 9,628 shares from the REIT, which
would correspond to 1,444 shares for the Smiths' 15% interest. (P-64.) At the time of
the closing of the REIT, the REIT methodology would have yielded 8,793 shares
allocated to the Partnerships, and 1,319 shares ($23,082.50 value) to the Smiths. Both
calculations used the same methodology, but resulted in different allocations due to
intervening changes in costs from the delay due to the failed closings. The 20,793
number actually given to the Partnerships comes from adding 8,973 (REIT value) and
12,000 (Price contributions). The 13,319 number given to the Smiths in January is
calculated by taking the Smiths' 15% share of the REIT valuation, then adding all (rather
than 15%>) of Price's contribution of 12,000 shares. A chart reflecting these numbers is
found in footnote 25.
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demonstrate positive value and preserve the tax status of the Partnerships and their partners,
including the Smiths. (R 4545 at 1111,1166-67,1288-90,1294-95.) The Chemical Bank
loan was paid, and a portion of the new debt was allocated to the Partnerships to preserve or
confer tax advantages, the benefit of which was given to the Smiths (and not to the other
partners in the Partnerships). (R 4550 at 1937.) The undisputed testimony of the REIT
expert who testified at trial established that the allocation to the Partnerships at closing was
"very fair" and that Price went "overboard" to give benefit to the Smiths. (R 4546 at 128890, 1328.)
6.

Post-Closing Discussions and Settlement Offers Between Smith and Fairfax.

Following the closing of the REIT on January 21, 1994, Smith continued his objections to
the REIT valuation and to the Partnership accounting issues. (R 4540 at 297; 4550 at 193941,2006;P-80,81,82;D-401.)
In a letter to Smith dated March 8, 1994, Fairfax offered Smith two proposals.

(P-

82.) (A copy of this letter is included in the Addendum at lab I.) Under the first proposal,
Fairfax offered the Smiths 1,319 units, reflecting their 15% share of the January 1994
computation (8,793), plus 13,179 additional units (from Price) for their capital call (without
The Smiths argued that this letter was "an exhibit that [Fairfax] didn't want to see the
light of day, but it is. This is like a piercing light. This document isn't going to go away.
It is the smoking gun of this trial. Because after all of this . . . they send this letter to
Armand Smith, and they say that the REIT units aren't 20,793. They say that there is an
original computation . . . of 8,793 units for the whole partnership, of which you are
entitled to 15 percent." (R 4551 at 2057.) The irony of the Smiths' argument is that this
letter provided the Smiths with an even more advantageous allocation than under a strict
REIT accounting. Fairfax objected to the introduction of this settlement offer under Utah
Rule of Evidence 408, which objection was denied.
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interest), which at $17.50 per unit represented a total value of $253,715. (R 4545 at 123739, 2000-01.) This offer was 1,178 units (or $20,000) better than what he had been told his
allocation would be in January. Alternatively, Fairfax offered the Smiths the value
equivalent to the January allocation, but largely in cash: cash of $230,640 for their capital
contribution (without interest) plus 352 units for their 15% interest (worth an additional
$6,160) based on a revised computation with "full accrual of interest on the partner loans''
to preserve Smith's tax position.26 (R 4550 at 1938.)

26

The following table tracks the allocations (actual and theoretical) from December 1993
through trial:
Date

Smiths' 15%
Share Per
REIT Method

P-ship
Units Per
REIT
Method
9,628*

P-ship
Actual
Units

8,793

20,739

1,319
($23,082)

8,793*

20,793

3/8/94H2
offer
(P-82)

2,348*

2000
Discovery

20,793***

12/1/93
estimate
(P-64)
1/20-21/94
closing
(P-58, D442)
3/8/941)1
offer
(P-82)

Smiths' 15%
Share of
Actual Units

What the
Smiths Were
Told

Reason for Difference m the Smiths'
Allocation

1,444**

All numbers based on REIT
methodology

3,119
($54,582)

13,319*
($233,082)

Price's 12,000 shares would have
been added to the Smiths' REIT
units under this calculation

1,319*
($23,082)

3,119
($54,582)

14,498*
($253,715)

20,793

352*
($6,160)

3,119
($54,582)

352 plus
$230,640 cash*
($236,800)

20,793*

3,119**
($54,582)

3,119**
($54,582)

N/A

13,179 shares would have been
added to the Smiths' REIT units,
\v hich was the value of their capital
call without interest - shares would
have come from Price's 12,000
contribution and 1,178 shares from
Price and/or Price-related partners
New REIT calculation results from
change in intercompany loan
balance (1 e , "full accrual of
interest"), and the Smiths' capital
call without interest would have
been paid in cash
Same number as 1/21 /94

1,444**

* Denote*> the infoimation aictually disc osed to the Smiths at thait time.
** Denotes information that the Smiths could have calculated by multiplying the
Partnership units by 15%.
*** Fairfax lowered the capitalization rate on the 2000 calculation so as to reach the
20,793 (inclusive of Price's contribution) under the REIT method.
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In April 1994, the parties met in Salt Lake City. Smith claims that when he asked
"about the other options," he was told for the first time that the Mall had already been
contributed to the REIT even though he had received copies of the Prospectus. (R 4541 at
359-60.) When Smith asked why he had not been given earlier notice, Fairfax allegedly
told him that "due to the size and significance of this transaction, they chose to ignore [his]
interest." (R 4541 at 360.) After that meeting, a copy of the Contribution Agreement was
provided to Smith. (P-90; R 4551 at 361-62.)
7.

Litigation. Smith then retained counsel in June 1994 to bring this lawsuit.

(R 4551 at 364.) During litigation, Fairfax produced a chart reflecting the allocation to the
Partnerships of 20,793 REIT units.27 (R 4550 at 1979; D-449.)
At trial, the Smiths pointed to partnership records showing that Fairfax had charged a
5% management fee for the partnership, instead of the correct 3.9%, (R 4546 at 1200-02),
but they presented no evidence of the amount of any overcharge or other claim of injury.
The Smiths also put on evidence that Fairfax combined the Partnerships' banking account
with the accounts of other Fairfax properties contrary to the Partnership agreements.
However, the Smiths did not dispute Fairfax's evidence that (1) this was done in order to
obtain greater earnings on the funds and for administrative efficiency, and (2) Smith had
known about this practice since 1990 without raising an objection. (R 4540 at 224-25; 4541
at 418-19.) The Smiths put on no evidence of any injury from combining of the accounts.

Prior to closing argument, the Smiths represented that in the event of a favorable
judgment, they would relinquish any ownership claim to the REIT shares. (R 4551 at
2041.)
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The Smiths did present evidence of damage, through their damages expert, Merrill
Norman, who relied on the appraisal of the Mall by John Howden, to calculate damages.
(R. 4544, p. 948.) Norman testified that if the Mall had been sold at fair market value
without the REIT (ignoring the imminent foreclosure), the proceeds of that sale would have
benefited the Smiths as follows: (1) repayment of their capital call ($228,390) with interest,
(2) repayment of their capital contribution of certain water rights ($30,000), and (3) fifteen
percent of the remaining proceeds as repayment of the balance of their capital ownership
interest ($149,004). (P-173A; R. 4543 at 805-12; 4544 at 860-66.) The total of these
figures (without interest) is $407,394.

Mr. Norman's damage calculation was set forth in

Exhibit 173, a copy of which is included at Tab K of the Addendum. Mr. Norman then
presented evidence by way of calculations of compound prejudgment interest as follows:
(1) $443,023 of interest on the $228,390 capital contribution (lines 13 and 15) since 1990,
and (2) $154,198 in prejudgment interest on value of the Smiths' 15% remaining equity
9Q

interest (line 10a), for a total prejudgment interest claim of $597,221.00.

The Smiths

presented no other evidence of compensatory damages, including no showing of what
The water rights were contributed for "an increase in [the Smiths'] capital account."
(P-47.) Under the unambiguous terms of the Partnership agreements, such contributions
do not accrue interest. (P-15 at T| 4.) Initially, the Trial Court ruled that no interest would
accrue on the value of that contribution. (R 4543 at 830.) At the time of the jury
instructions, however, the Trial Court erroneously reversed itself, allowing the jury to
treat such rights as either "equity" or a "loan," presumably because of inconsistent
treatment of that contribution in partnership records. (R 3725.)
The Trial Court also allowed the Smiths to submit evidence of their expert witness
expenses ($60,091) as part of their damages. (R 4544 at 871-74.) Norman also
submitted a damage model assuming that the Smiths' capital calls were contributions to
the capital accounts that did not bear interest, yielding a damage figure of $478,961 as of
January 1, 1994, together with interest thereafter of $495,655. (R 4544 at 876-79.)
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would have been received in foreclosure, bankruptcy, or from any other alternative to the
REIT. (R 4544 at 917,934-35, 943, 974, 979-80.)
After trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Fairfax had breached the
partnership agreements, breached its fiduciary duty, and converted property belonging to the
Smiths. A copy of the Judgment on Special Verdicts of the Jury for Compensatory and
Punitive Damages ("Judgment") is included at Tab A of the Addendum. The jury awarded
damages to the Smiths on all three theories of liability of "$410,000 (not including the time
value of money or 'interest')"30 and "Damages due to time value of money or 'interest'" on
the breach of fiduciary duty claim of $690,000, which latter amount is $92,000 more than
the prejudgment interest evidence presented by the Smiths' damages expert. Id. The jury
awarded punitive damages of $5,500,000 against Fairfax on the breach of fiduciary duty
claim. Id.31
8.

Post-Trial Motions. The Trial Court denied Fairfax's posMrial motions and

entered the Judgment and also Special Findings of the Court on Punitive Damage Verdict of
the Jury (the "Special Findings"), a copy of which is included at Tab B of the Addendum.
(R 4493-97.) The Special Findings were drafted by the Smiths' counsel and expand on the
Trial Court's own Minute Entry. The Special Findings thus constitute a marshalling by the
Smiths of their punitive damages evidence.32 The Special Findings provide:

This number necessarily included some amount for expert witness fees.
•3 1

The Trial Court also awarded attorney fees to Smiths in an amount of $517,611.40 and
costs of $7,133.26. (R4505.)
The Smiths had proposed a finding that "in the partnership accountings of 1992 and
1993, partnership tax deductions and partnership phantom income were wrongfully,
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The jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence a pattern of
deceit, failure to disclose and misrepresentation with respect to the three
"options" which Price Development personnel discussed with Armand Smith
relative to formation by Price Development of a real estate investment trust.
To that end, there was substantial evidence:
-that Price Development failed to disclose to the Smiths that the
Contribution Agreements were executed by Price Development in late
September or October 1993, in which Price Development agreed to
convey the North Plains Mall Property to another Price entity, Price
Development Company, a Maryland limited partnership, for the
benefit of the JP Realty REIT;
-that said disclosure should have been made during the month of
September, October or November, 1993, but was not made even in
early December 1993 when Price Development submitted to Smiths a
"preliminary estimate" of the "REIT value" of the North Plains Mall;
-that the Contribution Agreement was not disclosed to the Smiths by
Price Development until April 1994, nearly three months after the
formation of the JP Realty REIT;
-that Price Development did not disclose to Smiths until March 1994
that they no longer had options with respect to their 15% interest of the
North Plains Mall being kept out of the REIT, or such interest being
purchased at the fair market value thereof;
-that the letter of March 8, 1994 setting forth "an original
computation" and a "revised computation" of the Smiths' interest in
the allocated REIT value of the North Plains Mall was false,
misleading and deceitful;
-that Price Development Company did not want the Smiths to interfere
by filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit prior to January 21,
1994 when the J.P. Realty REIT was created, established and
implemented;

unfairly and improperly allocated," but the Court deleted that finding. (R 4510.)
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-that the March 8, 1994 "revised calculation" of 312 units was
intentionally misleading and was in wanton disregard of the
partnership rights of the Smiths in the North Plains Mall Property;
-that Price Development Company never made an accurate accounting
to the Smiths as to Price Development's own calculation of the "REIT
value" of the Smiths' interest until the year 2000, after nearly six years
of litigation brought by Smiths to obtain an accounting and relief for
breach of fiduciary duty;
-Price Development paid itself, as general partner, excessive fees
beyond that clearly set forth in the Partnership Agreements;
-Price Development failed to maintain a separate bank account for the
North Plains Mall Partnerships, co-mingling all funds from all Price
owned properties and making it difficult to isolate and allocate
revenues, costs, expenses and net income of the North Plains Mall
Property;
-that Price Development accrued to itself interest on monies it
advanced to the Partnerships, which it referred to as capital call
contributions, but did not pay or accrue to the Smiths' interest on their
proportionate capital call contributions;
-that the Smiths were never advised by Price Development, as general
partner, of the potential conflicts which it and the Price principals had
with respect to the conveyance of the North Plains Mall property from
Price Development Company to Price Development Company, a
Maryland limited partnership, for the benefit of the JP Realty REIT;
-that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have
found that the conduct of Price Development Company in this case
was intentional and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Smiths;
-that the wealth of Price Development Company was reasonably in
excess of $37,000,000 as of the end of December 1999.
In neither the Minute Entry nor the Special Findings did the Trial Court provide a
detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the punitive damage
award was not excessive in light of the Crookston I and due process factors. Nor did the
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Trial Court make any findings that the conduct described in the Findings caused any injury
to the Smiths.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
On the issue of liability, the Trial Court allowed the Smiths to proceed at trial on the
theory that the Partnerships could have obtained the fair market, appraised value of the Mall
but for the REIT. However, the evidence at trial was insufficient—indeed there was no
evidence—to demonstrate that but for the Partnerships' participation in the REIT (or other
alleged breaches), the Smiths would have obtained the value they allege. Consequently, the
Trial Court erred in denying Fairfax's motion for summary judgment, motion in limine,
motion for directed verdict, and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this
issue.
In addition, the issue of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury.
Given the undisputed facts that Fairfax was attempting to save the Mall through the REIT
transaction, that there was no other alternative to foreclosure or bankruptcy, and that Fairfax
had hired and relied upon professional advisors, there was insufficient evidence to establish
malicious or recklessly indifferent conduct that injured the Smiths.
Moreover, even if punitive damages were properly before the jury, this Court in
conducting de novo review should eliminate or substantially reduce the amount of the $5.5
million award pursuant to the Crookston I factors. In fact, this case is classically
appropriate for eliminating or reducing punitive damages
Finally, the Trial Court erred in submitting prejudgment interest to the jury and in
allowing prejudgment interest on the Smiths' damages because all such damages depend on
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a calculation of the Mall's fair market value. Alternatively, the Trial Court failed to correct
the jury's award of $690,000, which was $92,000 higher than any evidence presented.
ARGUMENT
I.

As a Matter of Law and Undisputed Fact, the Smiths Failed to Establish Any
Injury Caused by the Partnerships' Contribution of the Mall to the REIT.
The Smiths' damage theories depended on the assumption that the Mall would have

been sold for "fair market value" if the property had remained on the market for a
"reasonable time" or "one year" rather than being contributed to the REIT.

(R 4543 at

670-73, 4544 at 942-45, 973-76.) Fairfax argued before, during, and after trial that
contribution of the Mall to the REIT was the only available alternative to foreclosure and
bankruptcy, so that a "fair market" or appraisal-based valuation of the Mall was
unsupported by the evidence. The Trial Court erred in denying Fairfax's motions on this
point.34

As is clear from Norman's testimony, the starting point for the calculation of damages
was the receipt of proceeds from a fair market sale, which, after paying off the Chemical
Bank loan, would be distributed to the partners. (R 4543 at 795-801; P-173; R 4544 at
860-83, 948.) The characterization of capital contributions, capital calls, loans, and
ownership interests, merely dictates the order in which such proceeds, if any, would be
distributed. (See P-15 at §§ 12, 14.) However, if there were no net proceeds of a sale,
then such characterizations would be immaterial.
34

If the REIT was the only available alternative, then the Smiths' claims would fail on
several related grounds, in addition to the causation argument discussed above. First, on
grounds closely related to causation, the Smiths would not have proved their damages
with reasonable certainty. The Smiths' evidence of fair market value (what a willing
buyer would pay to a willing seller not acting under duress) would not establish damages
where there would not have been a willing buyer prior to a foreclosure or other duress
sale. Second, under such circumstances the Smiths could not prove breach of fiduciary
duty. The Trial Court apparently agreed:
If the jury believe . . . and they were to conclude and agree that the [REIT] was the
25
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In Utah, the "law of damages seeks to place the aggrieved party in the same
economic position he would have had if the contract had been performed." Mahmood v.
Ross, 1999 UT 104, f38; see also Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d
620, 624 (Utah 1979) (contract claim); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,
1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (fiduciary duty claim). Thus, in this case, the Smiths' would be
entitled to only what they would have received if the Mall had not gone into the REIT.
The Smiths had the burden of proving that they were damaged by Fairfax's conduct
(i.e., participation in the REIT) and the amount of such damages "within a reasonable
certainty." Mahmood, 1999 UT 104, f20. Although causation issues are generally for the
jury, this Court has held that a trial court must grant a directed verdict on causation where
the issue of the "proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture":
[A] jury is [not] free to find a causal connection between a breach and some
subsequent injury by relying on unsupported speculation. Although juries may make
deductions based on reasonable probabilities, "the evidence must do more than
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability. Where there are probabilities the
other way equally or more potent the deductions are mere guesses and the jury
should not be permitted to speculate. The law is well established in this jurisdiction
that where 'the proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff must
fail as a matter of law.'"
Id., T|22 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Thus, the Smiths had to establish a

only option that John Price had available, there would be no breach of fiduciary
duty. . .. The plaintiffs are not really claiming here that somehow [Fairfax] did
the accounting wrong in a REIT context. What they are claiming is that they never
should have put this in without the consent of the plaintiffs in the first place.
(R 4546 at 1198.) Third, the Smiths could not establish a breach of contract because, as a
matter of law, a sale to the REIT to avoid foreclosure wold constitute a "partnership
purpose" under section 7.6 of the partnership agreements so that the Smiths' consent to
the REIT would not have been required. (See R 4538 at 86-89.)
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"reasonable probability]" that the Partnerships could have obtained the fair market value of
the Mall without the REIT. But if the evidence indicated that there were "probabilities .. .
equally or more potent" that the REIT was the only way to avoid foreclosure and
bankruptcy, then the issue of proximate causation was "conjecture," and the Smiths' claims
fail as a matter of law.
The evidence at trial was uncontroverted that the REIT was the only way to avoid
foreclosure. By late 1993 and early 1994, the Partnerships faced imminent foreclosure or
bankruptcy. Consequently, the Partnerships could not wait any longer for a buyer to offer
"fair market value" for the Mall. The Partnerships had unsuccessfully tried to sell the Mall
or obtain permanent financing over a period of four years through both in-house efforts and
the engagement of two separate national brokers, who had presented the Mall to over fifty
national lenders and potential buyers. Although Fairfax had arranged five short-term
extensions of the Chemical Bank loan between June 1991 and July 1993 for the purpose of
finding other financing or buyers, by July 1993, Chemical Bank served a notice of default,
demanded payment of the full loan balance, and agreed to grant only one more extension to
allow the Partnerships to complete the REIT. Thus, the evidence established that the
Partnerships were faced with imminent foreclosure or bankruptcy. The Smiths presented no
evidence that the fair market value of the Mall could have been obtained in foreclosure or
bankruptcy; rather, the only evidence in the record was that the Smiths would have lost their
partnership interests and suffered other serious adverse consequences.
The testimony of the Smiths' experts that they believed that the Mall could have
been sold for full fair market value (before foreclosure) was on its face unsupported
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speculation. Howden (the Smiths' appraiser) testified that he believed that a buyer or
financing source could have been obtained within a year. (R 4543 at 673.) However, he
conceded at trial that he did not know that Fairfax's had unsuccessfully tried to sell or
refinance the Mall for five years. (R 4543 at 170-72.) Likewise, Norman testified that he
believed that the Mall could have been sold prior to foreclosure based on the assumption
that Chemical Bank would have offered another extension. (R 4544 at 942-45, 973-77.)
However, Norman conceded that he never "conducted any analysis" of his own as to how
long it would take to sell the property, was unaware that prior attempts had been made to
sell the Mall, and was personally unaware of "whether Chemical Bank had reached the
point where it refused to grant any more extensions." (R 4544 at 942-45, 973-77.) Because
the undisputed evidence was that Chemical Bank had informed Fairfax that no further
extensions would be granted and that Fairfax had already made exhaustive efforts to find a
lender or buyer, the testimony of the Smiths' experts amounts to nothing more than
"conjecture" and is therefore insufficient as a matter of law to establish damages in this
case. Mahmood, 1999 UT 104, ^[22.
The Smiths never sought to calculate damages based on a theory that they should
have received more units from the REIT or what they might have received through
foreclosure or bankruptcy. Thus, the Smiths have advanced no evidence that they would
have received any recovery of their loans to or investment in the Partnership outside of the
REIT. This Court should therefore reverse the Trial Court's denial of Fairfax's motions for
judgment, and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Fairfax on all claims.
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II.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Submitting the Issue of
Punitive Damages to the Jury In the Absence of Evidence of Willful,
Deliberate, or Reckless Disregard of the Rights of Plaintiffs Proximately
Causing Injury, and Where Fairfax Took the Only Alternative Available
to Save the Property from a Total Loss.
The Trial Court denied Fairfax's motions for directed verdict, judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, and/or new trial for insufficient evidence to support an award of
any punitive damages. (R 3738-3811; 4157-4262; 4545 at 1002-05,1014; 4551 at 203435.) In so doing, the Trial Court erred because, as a matter of law, even marshalling the
punitive damages evidence presented by the Smiths, there was insufficient evidence to
allow the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury.
Under Utah law, punitives are allowed only where there is "willful and malicious
conduct,... o r . . . conduct which manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of, the rights of others." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186
(Utah 1983). In Behrens, this Court stated that "punitive damages may be awarded only in
exceptional cases," "should be awarded infrequently," and "must, if awarded, serve a
societal interest of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is not
likely to be deterred by other means." Id.
Punitive damages should not have been considered in this case. First, in evaluating
liability for punitive damages, a good faith reliance on advice of counsel militates against a
finding of maliciousness. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, § 779; cf Calhoun v. Universal Credit
Co., 146 P.2d 284, 288 (Utah 1944) (good faith or honest belief that conduct was lawful
precludes punitive damages even if belief was mistaken).
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Second, the conduct on which the Smiths rely for punitive damages had no causal
relation or nexus to the actual damages claimed by the Smiths. With respect to the
requirement of causation, this Court stated in Behrens:
A defendant's conduct must be malicious or in reckless disregard for the
rights of others, although actual intent to cause injury is not necessary. That
is, the defendant must either know or should know "that such conduct would,
in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another" and the
conduct must be "highly unreasonable conduct...."
675 P.2d 1186-87 (emphasis added; citation omitted). In other words, the conduct
supporting punitive damages should be the conduct proximately causing the underlying
damages in the case. This Court's conclusion regarding causation is consistent with the
general requirement that "[p]unitive damages are only available if the unlawful act
warranting actual damages was of a wanton and malicious nature." See First Interstate
Bank v. Interfund Corp., 924 F.2d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 3991) (emphasis added).
In the present case, the Smiths' asserted injury and damage was the decision to
convey the Mall to the REIT rather than holding out for the Mall's alleged fair market value
through a sale. Even if this Court were to conclude that Fairfax was wrong in its judgment
on those issues, there was no evidence at trial that those decisions and actions were
malicious or in reckless disregard of the Smiths' rights.
The following uncontroverted evidence contradicts any possible conclusion that
Fairfax acted in disregard of the Smiths' rights:
a.

The Mall had been experiencing financial shortfalls for years,

requiring not only a capital call to the partners but also an additional $1.5 million gap
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loan to meet ongoing expenses. Fairfax obtained the $1.5 million loan on its own
credit and provided those monies to the Mall.
b.

From 1989 through 1993, Fairfax made extensive but unsuccessful

efforts, individually and through national real estate brokers, to find a permanent
loan or a buyer for the Mall to pay off the $11.5 million Chemical Bank loan.
Although Fairfax was able to have the loan extended on five occasions, in July 1993,
Chemical Bank issued a notice of default and demanded payment in full and,
subsequently, told Fairfax that it would grant no further extensions beyond July
1994.
c.

In the face of the default notice and its inability to find financing or a

buyer, Fairfax determined that the only alternatives available at the time were to
allow the Mall go into foreclosure, to file for bankruptcy, or to sell the Mall to a
REIT, the proceeds from which sale could be used to pay off the Chemical Bank
loan. Fairfax ultimately concluded that the REIT alternative was the only way to
save the Mall, provide some positive value for the partners, and avoid personal
liability of the partners for tax recapture and deficiencies on the Chemical Bank loan.
d.

Fairfax used the services of Wall Street Brokerage houses specializing

in REIT transactions, as well as attorneys specializing in REIT, real estate, and SEC
matters in order to ensure that the REIT was properly organized and that the sale was
for the maximum value obtainable. Fairfax relied on the advice of its counsel that it
had the right under the Partnership agreements to sell the Mall to the REIT, and
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counsel directed the manner in which this was accomplished, including what could
be disclosed to the Smiths prior to closing.
e.

All partners in the seventy-five separate partnerships conveying the

thirty-eight separate properties to the REIT were treated proportionately equally
in the allocation of REIT units, except for certain favorable treatment given to the
Smiths. In addition, Fairfax/Price accepted a significant dilution of their/his interests
in order to enable the REIT to succeed.
f.

Other than the Smiths, no partner in this or in any other of the seventy-

five partnerships ever complained or made any claim about how their interests in the
REIT were handled.
This uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Fairfax tried to act in what it believed to be
the interest of the Partnerships and the Smiths. Even if Fairfax's decisions were different
than those that the Smiths would have made, those decisions were made in good faith and in
the context of a business dispute.
Nevertheless, the Trial Court pointed to six facts allegedly supporting an award of
punitive damages. First, the Smiths contend that Fairfax failed to disclose to the Smiths the
REIT Contribution Agreement for the Mall until April 1994. However, it is undisputed that
Fairfax was told by New York legal counsel that the securities laws precluded such
disclosure prior to issuance of the prospectus. Likewise, Fairfax did not seek the Smiths'
prior consent to the REIT based on New York counsel's interpretation of the Partnership
agreements. Furthermore, as noted above, the Smiths put on no causation evidence of any
damage from Fairfax's actions in this regard.
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Second, the Smiths point to Fairfax's letter of March 8, 1994 (written two and onehalf months after completion of the REIT) as containing a "revised calculation" that was
intentionally misleading. However, the Smiths were simply not injured in any way by that
post-closing letter. More importantly, even if Fairfax could be criticized for the way in
which it presented its proposals, it is undisputed that the letter represented an attempt by
Fairfax to augment the Smiths' recovery (at Fairfax's expense) beyond what other partners
and partnerships had received from the REIT to resolve the Smiths' objections.
Third, the Smiths presented evidence that Fairfax did not provide Smith an accurate
accounting of the number of shares (20,793) allocated to the Partnerships until the year
2000. However, it is undisputed that Fairfax disclosed to Smith in January and March 1994
his personal allocations that were much more valuable than merely calculating his 15%
share of the Partnerships' units. Moreover, the "late accounting" did not change the Smiths'
actual position and the Smiths pointed to no injury from the delay in receiving updated,
accurate accounting.
Fourth, the Smiths presented evidence that Fairfax charged a 5% management fee
rather than the 3.9% fee provided for in the partnership agreements. Even if this is true, the
Smiths presented no evidence on whether the error was intentional or negligent, and no
evidence as to the amount of any actual overcharge.
Fifth, the Smiths put on evidence that Fairfax combined the Partnerships' bank
account with the accounts of other partnerships, contrary to the terms of the partnership
agreements. Fairfax representatives testified this was done to earn a higher return and for
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administrative efficiency, and the Smiths put on no evidence of actual loss therefrom.
Furthermore, Smith knew of the combined account since 1990 but raised no objections.
Finally, the Smiths argued that Fairfax failed to advise them of Fairfax's potential
conflicts in the REIT transaction, although Fairfax allegedly disclosed the conflict to the
market in the Prospectus. Yet, the Smiths were in fact provided with a copy of the
Prospectus by special delivery as soon as released to the public. Also, Smith learned from
Fairfax the substance of the alleged conflicts during their 1993 discussions (such as the
valuation of the properties on a non-appraisal basis, payment by the REIT of debt
guaranteed by Price on other properties, the buy-out by the REIT of Price's co-partners in
the Cottonwood Mall, etc.). Further, the "potential" conflicts were at most just that—the
nature of the REIT valuation process and the oversight of the transaction by lawyers,
bankers, and REIT experts protected against any detriment to the Smiths from such
"conflicts." Finally, there was no evidence that Fairfax at any time treated the Smiths'
interests proportionately differently than the other partners in the Partnerships or the
partners in any other partnership involved in the REIT (except when Fairfax sought to
improve the Smiths' position.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Smiths, it nevertheless fails
to provide a basis for punitive damages. There is simply no evidence that any statement or
failure on the part of Fairfax caused the Smiths to take action or to forego action to their
detriment, or that any of Fairfax's actions caused injury to the Smiths.
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For these reasons, the evidence was insufficient to support a punitive damages
verdict and the case should be remanded for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on punitive damages.
III.

A De Novo Review of the Punitive Damages Award Shows That, Under
the Crookston I and Due Process Factors, the Award Is Excessive and
Should Be Reduced.
Fairfax's Motion for a New Trial on the question of punitive damages raised the

issue "whether the amount of punitives is excessive or inadequate, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 807. As
discussed below, the Trial Court committed error by failing to make a detailed finding on
whether the punitive damages award was excessive in light of the Crookston I standards.
More importantly, de novo review by this Court will show that, if punitive damages are
warranted at all, they should be substantially less than this Court's 3:1 ratio guideline for
compensatory damages (prior to prejudgment interest).
A. The Trial Court's Failure of Necessary Review.
The punitive damages award in this case had a ratio to compensatory damages of at
least 5:1 (and actually as high as more than 13:1). (See section C(vii) below.) When a
punitive damages award exceeds a 3:1 ratio, "[t]he presumption . . . is that the award is
excessive." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993) ("Crookston II").
"However,... this presumption may be overcome if the trial court explains why the case is
unique in terms of one of the traditional seven factors or in terms of some other compelling
factor." Id. The Trial Court made no such explanation here. Its failure to do so was plain
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error. In light of this Court's adoption of a de novo standard of review, that failure by the
Trial Court should be corrected by this Court.
B. De Novo Review by This Court.
This Court has adopted "the de novo standard for reviewing jury and trial court
conclusions under the Crookston I factors." 2001 UT 89, TJ13, 22. The United States
Supreme Court in Cooper Indus, v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001),
explained why independent, de novo review by an appellate court is appropriate and
necessary: legal principles relating to the excessiveness of punitive damage awards are
"fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the
standards are being assessed.... Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate
courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles." 121 S. Ct. at 1685. In
this way, the factors to be considered in determining whether punitive damages are
excessive "will acquire more meaningful content through case-by-case application at the
appellate level." Id. De novo review by appellate courts based on the required factors
further "tends to unify precedent" and "stabilize the law."3:> Id. The reasoning of the Court

Additionally, persuasive reasons exist under the "passion and prejudice" standard in Utah
R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5) for this Court to review de novo the jury's punitive damage award for
excessiveness. The same seven factors outlined by this Court in Crookston I apply to both
the constitutional and "passion and prejudice" analyses. See Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 801
n.l 1, 808; Campbell, 2001 UT 89,1[22. As stated by this Court in Crookston I: "through the
requirement of an articulation of reasons for sustaining or modifying damage awards, we
establish a mechanism for the further development of the law. The express consideration of
the norms by which awards are determined will promote careful review by both trial and
appellate courts of the policies underlying punitive damages and the facts pertinent to a
vindication of those policies on a case-by-case basis." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 813.
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in Cooper mirrors in many respects this Court's analysis in Crookston I. The present case
provides the Court with a unique opportunity to "unify precedent" and "stabilize the law"
under the facts of this case, among other reasons by contrast with the facts in Campbell
In addition, punitive damages operate as "private fines" and are "intended to punish
the defendant and deter future wrongdoing." Id. at 1683, 1686. A jury's award of punitive
damages is not a finding of "fact." Id. Therefore, as stated by the Court in Cooper:
Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice, does
more than simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to
punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform treatment of similarly situated
persons that is the essence of law itself.
Id. at 1685 (quoting BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996)).
"[Ajppellate review makes certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their amount
and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition."
Cooper at 1686 n.9 (citation omitted).
C. The Seven Crookston I Factors,
De novo review by this Court of the Crookston I factors demonstrates compelling
reasons to set aside or to substantially reduce the punitive damages award of $5.5 million.
The factors to be analyzed by this Court in considering whether the punitive damages award
was excessive in this case are:
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct;
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on
the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the

In order to meet these objectives, this Court has reduced punitive damages in a number of
cases. See Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 801, n.12.
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misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual
damages awarded.
See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, T[17; Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 808.
(i)

Fairfax's Relative Wealth. In the present case, the award of $5.5

million in punitive damages, which represented approximately 15% of Fairfax's total wealth
of approximately $37 million, was disproportionately excessive. In Campbell, this Court
referred to a Seventh Circuit holding that a a typical punitive damage award may be around
one percent of the defendant's net worth," as providing a helpful (but not binding) guideline
in reviewing a punitive damage award. Campbell, 2001 UT 89,1J23 (citing Cash v. Beltman
N. Am. Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990)). In both Campbell and Crookston,
where the conduct of State Farm Insurance and Fire Insurance Exchange was highly
egregious and reprehensible, the percentage of the defendant's wealth, awarded as punitive
damages was well less than 1%. Campbell, at ^ 26, j7 Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 815-16. The
award in this case exceeds that 1% guideline by 15 times.
Moreover, given the evidence in both Campbell and Crookston of long, companywide history of extensive and aggravated wrongdoing promoted as a matter of company
policy by management of both the defendants on a national level, a relatively larger award
was deemed necessary in those cases to attract the defendants' attention and to deter them
from further bad conduct. Campbell, 2001 UT 89, 1J26; Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 800. No
similar showing was made in this case. This was a simple partnership dispute. There were
37

In Campbell State Farm's wealth was $54.75 billion and the punitive damages awarded
were $145 million. Campbell, 2001 UT 89 at Tj 26. In Crookston, Fire Insurance
Exchange's wealth was $723 million, and the punitive damages awarded were $4 million.
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no complaints by other partners in properties transferred to the REIT. The compensatory
damage award alone, representing almost 3% of Fairfax's wealth, is far more than needed to
attract the company's attention. Consideration of this factor clearly supports substantially
reducing the punitive damages award.
(ii) & (iii) Nature of Fairfax's Conduct and Facts and Circumstances
Surrounding That Conduct. These factors are analyzed together because they are
interrelated. As stated in Campbell, the second Crookston factor "analyzes the nature of the
defendant's conduct in terms of its maliciousness, reprehensibility, and wrongfulness." Id.,
TJ27. "It mirrors the [due process] 'reprehensibility' factor described . . . in BMW." Id. The
third factor "looks to the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct, particularly with
respect to what the defendant knew and what was motivating his or her actions." Id., f 35.
As discussed above, Fairfax's central conduct—the REIT transaction—was for the
interest and benefit of all partners, including the Smiths. Fairfax believed it was acting to
save the Mall from foreclosure. Absent the action taken by Fairfax, the Smiths would have
been worse off. In considering the REIT alternative, including the degree of necessary
disclosure or consent of the Smiths, Fairfax undisputedly relied on professional advisors.
The nature of Fairfax's conduct, therefore, was neither malicious nor reprehensible. Nor do
the circumstances surrounding that conduct support punitive damages.
Unable to contradict the fact that Fairfax pursued the REIT transaction to avoid
foreclosure for the benefit of all partners, the Smiths argue that Fairfax had a self-interest in
the transaction. But the fact that benefiting all the partners necessarily benefited Fairfax as
well proves nothing. Notably, the law of fiduciary duty requires that a general partner
39Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

protect and preserve the partnership property and the interests of all partners. See Covalt v.
High, 675 P.2d 999,1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerships, § 426.
Faced with the alternative of a total loss of the Mall through foreclosure or bankruptcy,
Fairfax attempted to do exactly that, i.e., protect the interests of all partners.
Moreover, although the Smiths accuse Fairfax of self-dealing, it is undisputed that
Fairfax and Price in fact treated the Smiths better than the other partners and partnerships,
including themselves by increasing the value of the Mall, diluting their interest in the REIT,
and voluntarily contributing additional REIT units to the Partnerships. In any event, the
benefits that Fairfax/Price received from the REIT were received independently of the
Mall's participation in the REIT. Thus, the second and third factors support either
eliminating or substantially reducing the punitive damages award below the 3:1 ratio,
(iv) Effect of Fairfax's Conduct on the Smiths and Others. As stated in
Campbell, this factor "examines how [defendants'] conduct affected other people as well as
the [plaintiffs.]" Campbell, 2001 UT 89,1J37. "The larger the number of people affected,
the greater the justification for higher punitive damages." Id. In Crookston II, for example,
the Court justified a punitive damage award above a 3:1 ratio based on the facts that (a) the
insurance company's fraudulent practices, carried on nationwide, were inflicted on
"countless" policyholders over extended periods of time, (b) the defendant had many offices
in Utah, (c) the fraud was of the most blatant kind and was "committed with almost certain
knowledge that the Crookstons would be exposed to ruinous bankruptcy," and (d) the
defendant's conduct seriously affected the plaintiffs in other ways. 860 P.2d at 940-41. The
effect of the misconduct in Campbell on both the plaintiffs and the public was similarly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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devastating. See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, UU38-40 ("the Campbells lived for nearly eighteen
months under constant threat of losing everything they had worked for their whole lives,"
State Farm injured "countless customers," "corrupted its employees" upon threat of losing
their jobs, and distorted practices industry wide).
On the facts of this case, there is no justification for even a 3:1 ratio of punitive
damages here, much less a higher ratio. It is undisputed that had the Mall not been
conveyed to the REIT, the Smiths would have lost most or all of their partnership interests,
and Smith could have been personally liable on his guaranty and suffered serious tax
consequences.
In addition, there is no evidence that Fairfax's conduct affected anyone else. No
partner, other than the Smiths, in the Partnerships or in any of some seventy-five other
partnerships conveying property to the REIT, claimed that the REIT was handled
improperly or that they were harmed thereby in any way. Further, the REIT was a one-time
occurrence for Fairfax, unlike the repeated wrongs noted in Campbell and Crookston I. In
short, analysis of this factor clearly recommends eliminating or reducing the punitive
damages award here to significantly less than the 3:1 ratio.
(v) Probability of Future Recurrences. The punitive damages award in this
case cannot be supported by any policy of deterring a future recurrence of any misconduct.
The REIT was a one-time occurrence for Fairfax in light of the deteriorating lending and
shopping mall market that existed at the time. There was no evidence that Fairfax had ever
engaged in other settings in the conduct of which the Smiths complain. No other partner in
any partnership selling properties to the REIT made a claim that the REIT was handled
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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improperly. In addition, there was no challenge to the undisputed evidence that Fairfax
enjoys a good reputation in the real estate industry and, because of that reputation, was able
to receive concessions from Chemical Bank, including six loan extensions on behalf of the
Mall. (R 4541 at 354.) Thus, there is nothing in the record to show any likelihood, or even
a possibility, that there will ever be a recurrence of any alleged misconduct.
(vi) Relationship of the Parties. As stated in Campbell, this factor analyzes
"the degree of confidence and trust placed in the defendant." Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ^[44.
"The greater the trust placed in the defendant, the more appropriate the imposition of a large
punitive damage award." Id.
Although a fiduciary relationship may sometimes support a large punitive damages
award, see id., the facts of this case do not warrant treating that as a compelling factor here.
The Smiths raised their own objections to the REIT, thereby indicating their own
independent analysis of the situation. The Smiths did not present any evidence that they
relied to their detriment on any disclosure, failure to disclose, or other conduct on the part of
Fairfax as summarized in the Trial Court's punitive damage findings. Moreover, most of
the alleged non-disclosures were either disclosed in substance by Fairfax prior to the closing
of the REIT, or were prompted by advice of counsel.
The undisputed evidence showed that Fairfax's decision to contribute the Mall to the
REIT was motivated solely to save the Mall rather than to promote any allegedly conflicting
interest Fairfax or Price may have had in the REIT. Fairfax did not need to include the Mall
for the REIT to succeed. The other properties conveyed to the REIT were adequate to serve
that purpose. Id. Indeed, Fairfax's return from the REIT due to the other partnerships was
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in fact decreased by the Smiths' participation in the REIT. It was undisputed that the
Smiths were awarded special concessions (to Price's detriment) not given to the other
partnerships, to either resolve the Smiths' objections or to prevent adverse tax consequences
to the Smiths.
(vii) Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages. This Court has made it
clear that "the amount of a punitive damage award generally must bear a 'reasonable and
rational' relationship to the actual damages." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 810. As a general
rule, "where the punitives are well below $100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to
1 ratio to actual damages have seldom been upheld and . . . where the award is in excess of
$100,000, [the Court has] indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios of
less than 3 to 1." Id.
The ratio of punitive damages ($5.5 million) to the total damages ($1.1 million) in
the present case is 5 to 1. Thus, punitive damages in this case significantly exceed the
bounds of the general ratio pattern set by this Court's prior decisions. See Crookston I, 817
P.2dat807, 810.
More importantly, when the Court removes prejudgment interest from the base
damages, as it should, the ratio of punitives to non-prejudgment interest compensatory
damages of $410,000 becomes an even more egregious ratio of 13 to 1. Utah courts have
not expressly considered whether prejudgment interest is included in the compensatory base
in this type of review.

However, in reviewing the punitive damages in this case, the Court

TO

Under both Crookston I and Crookston II, however, punitive damages on "soft"
compensatory damages "must be awarded with caution" and "are not to be given equal
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should review the punitive damages under a 13:1 ratio (by excluding prejudgment interest
from consideration) for three reasons. First, as discussed below, prejudgment interest is a
question of law for the court. The jury should not have had evidence of such interest before
it at the time of its punitive damages deliberations so that such interest cannot support the
jury's award. Second, prejudgment interest is not available in this case because damages
were not calculable with mathematical certainty. Third, calculating punitive damages as a
multiplier of an interest award is the economic equivalent of awarding prejudgment interest
on the punitive damages themselves, Seminole Pipeline Co., Mapco, Inc. v. Broad Leaf
Partners, 979 S.W.2d 730, 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (detailed demonstration of economic
equivalence)—a practice this Court has already rejected. First Sec. Bank v. J.B.J.
Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982).
The high ratio is yet another indication that the punitive damage award is excessive
in this case and in violation of Fairfax's due process rights, and that the jury acted out of
passion or prejudice . Moreover, the award in no way bears a "reasonable and rational
relationship to the actual damages,'' as required by Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 810.
In summary, the Crookston factors weigh heavily against the punitive damages
award in this case and demonstrate its excessiveness. Thus, in the event that the Court does
not remand for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the punitive damages
weight with hard compensatory damages when evaluating their relationship between
punitive and compensatory damages." Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940; Crookston I, 817
P.2d at 806, 811-12 n.29. A similar analysis here suggests that prejudgment interest
should not be included in the damages base for purposes of calculating the punitive
damages ratio. And since the jury's verdict necessarily included at least some amount of
expert fees, that amount is also not a proper damage component for calculating the ratio.
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claim, this Court should reduce the punitive damages significantly below the 3:1 guideline
or, alternatively, grant a new trial.
IV.

The Trial Court Erred By Disregarding Controlling Utah Law
Precluding Prejudgment Interest on an Unliquidated Claim and by
Concluding That There Was Evidence Sufficient to Support the Amount
of the Jury's Award of Prejudgment Interest.
Over Fairfax's objection, the Smiths presented evidence of, and the jury awarded,

$690,000 in prejudgment interest on breach-of-fiduciary-duty damages, which were based
on or derived from the fair market, appraised pre-REIT value of the Partnerships. (P-173; R
4388.) The Trial Court committed three errors with respect to prejudgment interest: first,
the Trial Court erred in submitting the issue to the jury; second, the Trial Court erred by
permitting interest on any damages derived from an estimate of the fair market value of the
Partnerships; and third, the Trial Court erred in denying Fairfax's motion for a new trial or
remittitur based on the jury's excessive award.
A.

The Trial Court Erred In Submitting the Issue of Prejudgment Interest
to the Jury.

It is well settled that the "decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a
question of law." Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). As such, the trial
court erred in submitting the issue of prejudgment interest to the jury. As discussed above,

The same conclusion is directed by federal law. Under the three guideposts for federal
due process analysis - "'[1] the degree of reprehensibility of the [conduct]; [2] the disparity
between the harm suffered . . . and [the] punitive damages award; and [3] the difference
between this remedy [the punitive damage award] and the . . . penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases,'" Campbell, 2001 UT 89, f 39 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 57475 (1996) - the award here is excessive and requires reversal or significant reduction.
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that submission prejudiced Fairfax in the consideration of punitive damages, and, as will be
discussed below, the excessive award of prejudgment interest itself suggests that the jury
acted out of prejudice or passion.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Permitting an Award of Prejudgment Interest
on the Fair Market Value of the Smiths' Partnership Interest

Under Utah law, prejudgment interest should not have been awarded on damages
derived from or based on the fair market value of the Partnerships. The Smiths' argument
that there is a breach of fiduciary duty exception to such rules is inconsistent with Utah

1.

Fair Market Value Damages Are Not Calculable with
Mathematical Accuracy.

In Utah, the law is clear that prejudgment interest is not available where damages
"cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy " Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1387 (citations
omitted). This test is not satisfied where the amount of damages is a matter of "judgment"
or where an expert's damage "estimate" is "by no means the only way to arrive at [the
damage]." Id. The Utah Court of Appeals has already held on several occasions that the
valuation of real property may be inherently uncertain so as to preclude an award of

The Trial Court ruled, as a matter of first impression under Utah law, that the Smiths
would be entitled to "a reasonable amount of interest" on any breach of fiduciary duty
damages. (R 4539 at 92-99; 4543 at 829.) The Trial Court instructed the jury that, "In
the case of a breach of fiduciary duty, the benefit which [Fairfax] would have derived
from the breach may be of a continuing nature up to the time of trial, and if so, the
limited partners, Smiths, will be entitled to the time value of the monies on the amount of
damages sustained by the Smiths since the date of the breach of fiduciary duty to the date
of trial. (R 3720 (Instr. No. 44).)
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prejudgment interest. Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Smith
v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v.
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In the present case, the starting point of the Smiths' valuation of their Partnership
interest was an appraisal of the Mall by John Howden. (R 4542 at 549-743) (Howden's
testimony); 4543 at 945-53 (Norman's use of Howden's appraisal).) However, Howden
testified that there is no single method for appraising real property; rather, appraisers use
three different approaches to value real property: a cost-based approach, a sales-comparison
approach, and an income-capitalization approach, each of which requires the exercise of an
appraiser's professional judgment. (R 4543 at 549; see also 4542 at 555, 563-64. 627-32;
4543 at 659, 679-82.) He used two of these approaches to obtain values between
$15,900,000 to $16,400,000. In contrast, Fairfax presented two appraisals indicating a fair
market value of $11,400,000 and $12,700,000. (R 4546 at 1380; 4547 at 1498.) Howden
succinctly summarized the inherent uncertainty in appraisals when he testified: "appraising
is not a science—it is an art, not a science—we can have different opinions of value."
(R 4543 at 682; see also R 4546 at 1345,1348,1447,1464 (appraisals are "estimates" and
matters of "opinion" and it is common for appraisers to reach varying conclusions).)
Inasmuch as fair market value was based on estimates derived from a variety of
methods of calculation, each of which required the use of an appraiser's best judgment, the
Smiths' fair market value damages cannot accrue prejudgment interest under Utah law.
2.

There Is No Fiduciary Exception to Utah's Prejudgment Interest Rules.

The Smiths argued (and the Trial Court agreed) that prejudgment interest is allowed
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on damages for breach of fiduciary duty, even if those damages are not calculable with
mathematical accuracy—relying exclusively on cases from other jurisdictions awarding
prejudgment interest for breach of fiduciary duty on equitable grounds under a discretionary
standard.41 (R 3720 (Instruction No. 44); 4543 at 829).
However, a discretionary award of prejudgment interest based on equitable
principles would be contrary to almost a century of precedent from this Court. In its
landmark decision in Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), this Court
criticized discretionary awards of prejudgment interest:
There is another class of cases where the matter is relegated to the jury or the court
trying the case to allow interest or not, as in their judgment may seem proper, as a
part of the damages to be allowed. This rule does not seem to be based upon any
sound reason. Moreover, it must lead to uncertainty, and may tend to favoritism in
its application. . .. Whenever possible, it ought not be left to the mere caprice of
either court or jury to either grant or withhold that which is due. A fixed rule, when
based on sound principles, is, in most instances, a safer guide than the judgment of a
few individuals, however honest or pure their motives

41

See In re Wernick, 535 N.E.2d 876, 888 (111. 1989) ("In Illinois, prejudgment interest
may be recovered when warranted by equitable considerations . . . within the sound
discretion of the trial judge"); Ryan v. City of Chicago, 654 N.E.2d 483, 489 (111. App.
1995) ("An equitable award of interest is a matter within the circuit court's sound
discretion"); Jefferson NatT Bank v. Cen. NatT Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1155 (7th Cir.
1983) ("discretion of the court" under Illinois law); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
Inc., 637 F.2d 77, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1980) (federal securities laws) ("an award of
prejudgment interest is a matter of judicial discretion" and is "governed by fundamental
considerations of fairness"); In re Lash, 747 A.2d 327, 335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000) ("The decision to award or deny pre-judgment interest is within the discretion of
the trial judge," but the "discretion, however, 'must be exercised equitably'") (citation
omitted); McDermott v. Party City Corp., 11 F. Supp.2d 612, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("it is
within the discretion of the court to award prejudgment interest with regard to
unliquidated sums, such as that for breach of fiduciary duty"); Michelson v. Hamada, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (under California statute, "interest may be
given, in the discretion of the jury") (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).
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Id. at 1006 (emphasis added); see also Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1387 (entitlement to prejudgment
interest is a question of law reviewed for correctness rather than a matter of discretion
reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Moreover, this Court has also held that prejudgment
interest awards are inappropriate in cases of an equitable nature, which precedent is
inconsistent with an equitable basis for the Smiths' claimed award. See, e.g., Bellon v.
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991); see also Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp.,
1999 UT App. 335, ^24, 993 P.2d 222. Furthermore, Utah courts have in fact applied
traditional prejudgment interest principles in breach of fiduciary cases. See Lefavi v.
Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5,1ffl22-25, 994 P.2d 817.
Thus, this Court should reject the Smiths' new argument for prejudgment interest on
the established and well-founded precedent in this state.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Not Reducing or Vacating the Jury's Excessive
Award of Interest

The Trial Court also erred in refusing to correct the jury's excessive prejudgment
interest award of $690,000, which was $92,779 higher than the only evidence of
prejudgment interest presented by Norman for the Smiths. (P-173; R 3799-801; 4510.) The
evidence was insufficient to justify that verdict, resulting in "excessive . . . damages,
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," warranting a new
trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5); see also State v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1295, 1297 (Utah
1975); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1084 (Utah 1985). This
Court must, at a minimum, reduce the prejudgment interest damages by $92,779 or remand
for a new trial on this issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the trial court's judgment on the verdict should be
reversed and remanded for entry of judgment n.o.v. on (1) all claims because the REIT was
the only alternative to save the Mall, (2) all punitive damages claims because of the failure
to establish willful misconduct, and/or (3) all claims for interest. If the Court does not
remand for entry of judgment n.o.v. on these issues, it should remand for a new trial.
Alternatively, this Court should reduce the punitive damages award to an appropriate
amount under Utah law and the circumstances of this case, or remand for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of July, 2002.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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Attefrneys for Ap^Hants

663414

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
50 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 29th day of July, 2002, two true and correct
copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were hand-delivered to:
Mr. Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esquire
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5340
Attorneys for Appellees

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM

A.

Judgment on Special Verdicts of the Jury for Compensatory and Punitive
Damages

B.

Special Findings of the Court on Punitive Damage Verdict of the Jury

C.

Minute Entry (summary j udgment)

D.

Order of Pretrial Motions (in limine, summary judgment)

E.

Minute Entry (j.n.o.v., new trial, remittitur)

F.

Transcript of Oral Ruling (prejudgment interest on breach of fiduciary duty)

G.

Instruction 44 (prejudgment interest on breach of fiduciary duty)

H.

Exhibit P-64 (November 29, 1993 accounting)

I.

Exhibit P-82 (March 8, 1994 letter to Armand Smith)

J.

Exhibit 173A (Merrill Norman's damage calculations

K.

Partnership Agreement (North Plains Development Company Agreement of
Limited Partnership)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Van Cott
Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, Suite 1600 Key Bank Tower Suite, 50 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City. Utah. 84144-0340, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 21, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES was delivered to the following this

day of September, 2002 by:

[ x ] Hand Delivery
[

] Facsimile No.

[

] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[

] Federal Express

[

] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

Reed L Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
Snow, Christeneen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James S. Jardine, Esq.
Brent D. Wride, Esq.
Ray Quinney & Nebeker
36 S. State St., Ste 1400
Salt Lake City. UT 84145
Attorneys for Defendai

spg^r

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Judgement

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JUN 2 9 2001
h

jSALT LAKE COUNTY

By,
Deputy Clerk
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ARMAND L SMITH, Individually and as
Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr.
Trust and the Shannon S. Windham
Trust, and VIRGINIA L. SMITH,

JUDGMENT ON
SPECIAL VERDICTS
OF THE JURY FOR

Plaintiffs,

COMPENSATORY &
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a
Utah limited partnership,
Defendants.

ENTERED IN
I N REGISTRY
HCCIbll

OF JUD(
DGMEWTS
DATE

Civil No. 940904312CV
Honorable Frank G. Noel
Presiding District Court Judge

The above-referenced case came on for triai by jury on Monday, the 26th day of March
2001, before the HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL, Presiding Third District Court Judge, on the
claims of the Plaintiffs (sometimes the "Smiths" herein) for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
Digitized by the
W. Hunter property,
Law Library, J.and
Reuben
Clark Lawdamages,
School, BYU. as well as the defendants'
contract, conversion
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partnership
punitive
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Price Development Company (n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc.) claim for declaratory judgment, the
Plaintiffs appearing through and being represented by their attorneys of record, Robert S.
Campbell and James E. Magleby of Salt Lake City and the Defendants appearing through and
being represented by their counsel of record, Reed L. Martineau and Rex E. Madsen of Salt
Lake City.
A jury of eight persons with one alternate juror having been selected and empaneled by
the Court to try the issues of fact, opening statements were made and evidence and testimony
thereafter received on March 26, 2001 and continuing for 14 court trial days, during which time
witnesses were sworn and testified, and documents were received by the Court. The parties,
pursuant to stipulation, reserved the issue of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party as provided
by Article 19 of the Partnership Agreements to be resolved by the Court after the return the
jury's special verdict.
On Wednesday, April 11,2001, both sides having rested their cases, the Court charged
the jury as to the law to be applied to the evidence with respect to whether Price Development
Company had breached its fiduciary duty to the Smiths, whether Price Development Company
had breached its contract with the Smiths, and if so, whether Price Development Company had
converted partnership assets and the damages, if any, sustained by the Smiths as a proximate
cause or consequence of Price Development's conduct as well as whether punitive damages
should be entered against Price Development Company and in favor of the Smiths. Closing
argument was presented on the same day, April 11, 2001 and at approximately 3:10 p.m., the
jury retired to deliberate on their special verdict.
At approximately 7:05 p.m. on said 11 th day of April, 2001, the jury returned into open
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Court the following Special Verdict:
"SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY
1.

Did the defendant, Price Development Company, breach the partnership
agreements, as alleged by plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

2.

Yes

X

No

Did the defendant Price Development Company, breach its fiduciary duties, as
alleged by plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

Yes

X

No

If the answer to this question is "No,"
do not answer Question No. 3.

3.

Was Price Development Company's breach of fiduciary duty a proximate cause
of any damages sustained by plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

4.

Yes

X

No

Did the defendant Price Development Company, convert property belonging to
plaintiffs?
ANSWER:

5.

Yes

X

No

If you answered either Question Nos. 1,3, or 4 "Yes," then state the total amount
of all damages, if any, sustained by all plaintiffs together.
DAMAGES:

$

410,000

(Not including time value of money

or "interest.")
DAMAGES due to time value of money or "interest."

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$
6.

690,000

Should punitive damages be awarded against Price Development Company and
in favor of the Smiths?
ANSWER:

Yes

X

No

Dated this 11 th day of April 2001.
Ashley James Anderson
Foreperson"
The Court having received and entered the Special Verdict of the Jury, thereupon
proceeded with the punitive damage phase of the case, pursuant to stipulation of the parties,
on the following morning, Thursday, April 12,2001. Testimony and evidence were received with
respect to the wealth and financial position of the defendant, Price Development Company,
further closing arguments were made by counsel for the respective parties, and the jury
thereupon retired to consider its Special Verdict on Punitive Damages.
At approximately 12:05 p.m. on said day, April 12, 2001, the jury returned into open
Court its Special Verdict Re Punitive Damages as follows:
"MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
What amount of punitive damages should be awarded against Price
Development Company?

$

5.500,000

Dated this 12th day of April, 2001.
Ashley James Anderson
Foreperson"

The Court thereupon received the Special Verdict on Punitive Damages and entered it
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upon the records of the Court. No party asked for the jury to be polled and the jury panel was
thereupon dismissed and the Court adjourned with counsel for the Plaintiffs being requested to
prepare the form of judgment.
The Court being now fully advised as to all and singular the law and fact in the premises,
having concluded that the Special Verdict of the Jury and the Special Verdict Re Punitive
Damages were duly and properly returned, and having entered Special Findings of the Court
determining that there was evidence for the jury from which it could reasonably conclude that
the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury was justified under the facts and
circumstances, which Special Findings should be annexed to and made a part of the Judgment,
and that a Judgment should be thereupon entered upon said Verdicts in favor of the Smith
Parties and against Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. for breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion of partnership property, breach of contract and punitive damages and
that Price Development Company's claim for declaratory judgment should be denied and hence
dismissed, and that the Court, pursuant to agreement and stipulation of the parties, has
determined the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to Smiths as the prevailing party under
Article 19 of both North Plains Development Partnership and the North Plains Land Partnership
and as the prevailing party on the breach of fiduciary duty claims.
NOW, THEREFORE, for good cause shown,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
I.

THAT on the Special Verdict of the jury for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract and conversion of the partnership property, judgment be, and the same
is hereby entered, in favor of Armand L Smith, individually and as Trustee for
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the Armand L. Smith, Jr. Trust and the Shannon S. Windham Trust, and Virginia
L Smith and against Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in
the sum and amount of $1,100,000.00, inclusive of $690,000.00 due to the time
value of money or interest on the breach of fiduciary duty claims;
II.

THAT on the Special Verdict of the Jury Re Punitive Damages for breach of
fiduciary duty, judgment be, and the same is hereby entered, in favor of Armand
L Smith, individually and as Trustee for the Armand L Smith, Jr. Trust and the
Shannon S. Windham Trust, and Virginia L

Smith and against Price

Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in the sum and amount of
$5,500,000.00;
III.

THAT the combined and total judgment of $6,600,000.00 be and the same shall
bear interest from the date of the judgment as provided by law;

IV.

THAT the Plaintiffs, Smith Parties, be and they are hereby entitled to an award
of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as the prevailing party under Article 19
of the partnership agreements and under their claims for breach of fiduciary duty.
The Court has considered the attorney fee application of $517,611.40 submitted
by the Smith Parties, the affidavit submitted in support of the application by
Carmen K. Kipp, Esq., and the other papers submitted by both parties on the
issue of attorney fees.

Based on these submissions, the Court finds and

concludes as follows:
a.

That Price Development has not contested that the Smiths are entitled
to recover attorney fees and costs under the partnership agreements and
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for their breach of fiduciary duty claims;
b.

That Price Development has not contested the Smiths Parties' attorney
fee application to the extent it seeks $457,544.44, and thus this amount
of attorney fees are reasonable. Independently, the Court finds these
fees and costs are reasonable under the factors set forth in Dixie State
Bank and as established by the uncontested affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp,
Esq.

c.

That the Smith Parties are also entitled to recover attorney fees and
costs in the amount of (i) $34,000.00 for time spent on this case by lead
trial counsel, Roberts. Campbell; (ii) $22,534.16 for attorney fees and
costs incurred from the Snell & Wilmer law firm; and (iii) $3,522.88 for
attorney fees and costs incurred from the Leverick & Musselman law
firm.

The Court further finds these attorney fees and costs are

reasonable and consistent with the factors to be considered under Dixie
State Bank, other controlling precedent, the additional factors set forth in
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and as established by the
uncontested affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp, Esq.
d.

That Judgement be and is hereby entered in favor of Armand L. Smith,
individually and as trustee and Virginia L Smith and against Price
Development Company, n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. for and in the amount
of $517,611.40 as reasonable attorney fees and $7,133.26 for
reasonable costs and expenses;
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V.

THAT the Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs and expenses of Court, as provided
by law;

VI.

THAT Defendants, Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. shall
take nothing by its claim of declaratory judgment, and the said claim be and the
same is hereby dismissed, no cause^B&a^tjgn, with prejudice.

DATED this

day of June, 20

FRANfTG. N
Presiding District
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
JAMES E. MAGLEBY
Attorneys for Armand L. Smith and
Virginia L. Smith, et al.

REED L. MARTINEAU
REX E. MADSEN
Attorneys for Price Development Company
n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc., et al.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of VanCott
Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, Suite 1600 Key Bank Tower, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84145-0340, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICTS OF
THE JURY FOR COMPENSATORY & PUNITIVE DAMAGES was delivered to the following
his O ^ g a v of June, 2001 by:
X ] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile No.
] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
] Federal Express
] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Defendants

s W ^ o kCA^LJl
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
Key Bank Tower, Suite 1250
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
Facsimile:
(801) 521-9598

Deputy Clerk

JAMES E. MAGLEBY
Ballard Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll LLP
One Utah Center, Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone:
(801)531-3000
Facsimile:
(801) 531-3001

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ARMAND L SMITH, Individually and as
Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr.
Trust and the Shannon S. Windham
Trust, and VIRGINIA L. SMITH,

SPECIAL FINDINGS OF
THE COURT ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGE
VERDICT OF THE JURY

Plaintiffs,
v.

PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a
Utah limited partnership,
Defendants.

Civil No. 940904312CV
Honorable Frank G. Noel
Presiding District Court Judge

Pursuant to the precedent of the Utah Supreme Court in Crookston v. Fire Insurance
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991), the Court herewith makes and enters Special
Findings of Fact with respect to the punitive damage award returned by the jury in the aboveDigitized
the Howard
W. Hunter
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
BYU.
referenced case
on by
the
11 th and
12th Law
days
of April,
2001,
as School,
follows:
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

The jury empaneled in this case returned into open Court a verdict of
compensatory damages on April 11, 2001 of $1,100,000 and answered "Yes" to
the question of whether punitive damages should be awarded against Price
Development Company and in favor of the Smiths

2

On the following day, April 12, 2001, the jury returned into open Court a verdict
finding that the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against Price
Development Company was $5,500,000

3.

With respect the jury's verdict of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion of
partnership property by Price Development Company, there was substantial
substantive evidence before the jury upon which a punitive damage award of
$5,500,000 00 is considered reasonable

4

The jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence a pattern of deceit,
failure to disclose and misrepresentation with respect to the three "options" which
Price Development personnel discussed with Armand Smith relative to formation
by Price Development of a real estate investment trust To that end, there was
substantial evidence
that Price Development failed to disclose to the Smiths that the
Contribution Agreements were executed by Price Development in late
September or October 1993, in which Price Development agreed to
convey the North Plains Mall Property to another Price entity, Price
Development Company, a Maryland limited partnership, for the benefit
of the JP Realty REIT,

2
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that said disclosure should have been made during the month of
September, October or November, 1993, but was not made even in early
December 1993 when Price Development submitted to Smiths a
"preliminary estimate" of the "REIT value" of the North Plains Mall;
that the Contribution Agreement was not disclosed to the Smiths by Price
Development until April 1994, nearly three months after the formation of
the JP Realty REIT;
that Price Development did not disclose to Smiths until March 1994 that
they no longer had options with respect to their 15% interest of the North
Plains Mall being kept out of the REIT, or such interest being purchased
at the fair market value thereof;
that the letter of March 8,1994 setting forth "an original computation" and
a "revised computation" of the Smiths7 interest in the allocated REIT
value of the North Plains Mall was false, misleading and deceitful;
that Price Development Company did not want the Smiths to interfere by
filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit prior to January 21,1994 when
the J. P. Realty REIT was created, established and implemented;
that the March 8,1994 "revised calculation" of 312 units was intentionally
misleading and was in wanton disregard of the partnership rights of the
Smiths in the North Plains Mall Property;
that Price Development Company never made an accurate accounting
to the Smiths as to Price Development's own calculation of the "REIT
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value" of the Smiths' interest until the year 2000, after nearly six years of
litigation brought by Smiths to obtain an accounting and relief for breach
of fiduciary duty;
Price Development paid itself, as general partner, excessive fees beyond
that clearly set forth in the Partnership Agreements;
Price Development failed to maintain a separate bank account for the
North Plains Mall Partnerships, co-mingling all funds from all Price owned
properties and making it difficult to isolate and allocate revenues, costs,
expenses and net income of the North Plains Mall Property;
that Price Development accrued to itself interest on monies it advanced
to the Partnerships, which it referred to as capital call contributions, but
did not pay or accrue to the Smiths interest on their proportionate capital
call contributions;
that the Smiths were never advised by Price Development, as general
partner, of the potential conflicts which it and the Price principals had with
respect to the conveyance of the North Plains Mali Property from Price
Development Company to Price Development Company, a Maryland
limited partnership, for the benefit of the JP Realty REIT;
that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have found
that the conduct of Price Development Company in this case was
intentional and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Smiths.
that the wealth of Price Development Company was reasonably in
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excess of $37,000,000 as of the end of December 1999.
that the punitive damage award of the jury in this case of $5,500,000 was
within the zone of reasonableness given the conduct of Price
Development and the circumstances of the case and clearly was not
excessive or disproportionate as to suggest or evidence passion or
prejudice of the jury;
Dated this ^

/day of June, 2001.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that ! am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of VanCott
Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, Suite 1600 Key Bank Tower, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 8414-0340, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SPECIAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGE VERDICT OF THE JURY was delivered to the following this

^fday

of June, 2001 by:
X ] Hand Delivery
] Facsimile No.
] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
] Federal Express
] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Defendants

ACQux/LJ
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FAIRFAX REALTY INC., Et al,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.940904312CV
Judge Frank G. Noel

Plaintiff,

Vs
ARMAND L. SMITH, Et al,
Defendant.

This matter
Judgment

is before

filed on behalf

the Court

on a Motion

of Counterclaimants

For

Armand

Individually and as Trustee, and Virginia L. Smith.

Summary

L. Smith,
The movants

argue that this Court can rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs
breached their fiduciary duty and their contract with defendants by
selling and purchasing certain partnership assets. The Court is of
the opinion that genuine issues of fact exist in this matter which
precludes the granting of the summary judgment.
With regard to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, there are
issues of fact as to whether under all the circumstances plaintiffs
acted fairly and in the best interest of the partnership.

With

regard to the breach of partnership agreement claim, the Court is
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MINUTE ENTRY

opinion that a factual question exists as to whether the consent of
the

partners

was

needed

in

order

to

engage

in

the

subject

transactions and the related question of whether the transactions
in question were for a partnership purpose.

There are of course

other related factual issues.
Accordingly,

the

Motion

For

Summary

Judgment

is

denied.

Counsel for plaintiff's is to prepare an appropriate Order.
Dated this

3

.Day of AUGUST, 1999:

Honorable Franl^G. Noe.
Presiding Judge

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FAIRFAX VS. SMITH

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MINUTE ENTRY, postage prepaid, to the following, this
-J?

day of AUGUST, 1999:

Robert S. Campbell
Gordon W. Campbell
Edward W. McBride
Campbell Moxley & Campbell
111 East Broadway, Suite 880
SLC, UT 84111
Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Michael R. Carlston, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
SLC, UT 84145

no.

LAA^

Deputy Court Clerk
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FILID DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 2 2 2001
OUNTY

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL
Key Bank Tower, Suite 1250
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith

By-

1-4^

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ARMAND L. SMITH, Individually and as
Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr.
Trust and the Shannon S. Windham
Trust, and VIRGINIA L. SMITH,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs
and Defendants,
ORDER ON
PRETRIAL MOTIONS
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a
Utah limited partnership,
Counterclaim
Defendants and
Plaintiffs.

Civil No. 940904312CV
Honorable Frank G. Noel
Presiding District Court Judge

A number of pretrial motions, including motions for partial summary judgment filed by both
parties, came on regularly for hearing before the Court, the HONORABLE FRANK E. NOEL,
Presiding District Judge, on Tuesday, March 13, 2001, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom S45 of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Matheson Court House in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs and Defendants Armand
L. Smith, individually and as Trustee and Virginia L. Smith ("Smiths"), being represented by their
counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. of Berman Gaufin Tomsic Savage & Campbell of Salt Lake City,
Utah and the Counterclaim Defendants and Plaintiffs, Price Development Company et al. ("Price
Development") being represented by their counsel, Rex E. Madsen of Snow Christensen and
Martineau of Salt Lake City, Utah.
Specifically, the following motions were before the Court for determination:
SMITHS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1

Motion in Limine to Exclude the Purported Expert Witness, Andrew S. Oliver

2

Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Alan L. Gosule, Esq.

3

Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smiths' Motion in Limine to Preclude the Purported Expert
Testimony of R. Todd Neilson

4

Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smiths' Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Report and
Purported Expert Testimony of Lawrence S. Kaplan

5

Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment That, as a Matter of
Law, Both Partnership Agreements Required Consent of the Smiths' Interests for
Price Development Company to Assign and Transfer the Partnership Real Property
to the REIT

PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
6

Price Development Company's Motion in Limine RE Exclusion of Evidence
Concerning Penalty Provision of Partnership Agreements

7

Price Development Company's Motion in Limine RE Damages

8

Price Development Company's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and
Testimony of Merrill Norman

9

Price Development Company's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and
Testimony of John Howden
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10

Price Development Company' Motion in Limine RE Exclusion of Evidence
Concerning Loss of Purchasing Power

11

Price Development Company's Motion for Declaratory and Partial Summary
Judgment

The Court, having received and considered the above-noted motions, the memoranda and
supporting materials submitted by the respective Parties, and having weighed and considered oral
argument of respective Counsel, and for good cause shown, hereby ORDERS
1.

That the Smiths' motion for partial summary judgment (motion no 5 above) is
DENIED

2

That the Smiths' motions in limine to exclude the expert witness reports and
testimony of Price Development's witnesses Andrew S Oliver, Alan L Gosule, R
Todd Nielsen, and Lawrence S Kaplan (motion nos 1, 2, 3, and 4 above), are
GRANTED IN PART, in that the Court rules that the measure of damages for the
Smiths' breach of contract claims are as a matter of law based upon the Fair Market
Value of the Smiths' partnership interests, and the "REIT value" is not relevant to
this measure of damages The remaining issues raised in the motions in limine,
including whether and how the REIT value is admissible with regard to the Smiths'
breach of fiduciary duty claims, are taken under advisement, and the Court will rule
on the admissibility of the reports and / or testimony at the time of trial, based upon
the development of the evidence

3

That Price Development's motion for declaratory partial summary judgment (motion
no 11 above) is DENIED
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4.

That Price Development's motions in limine regarding damages and to the exclude
the expert report of John Howden (motion nos. 7 and 9 above) are withdrawn by
Price Development, in light of the Court's denial of Price Development's motion for
partial summary judgment.

5.

That Price Development's motion in limine regarding the Article IX clause,
designated by Price Development as the "penalty provision" of the partnership
agreements (motion no. 6 above) is GRANTED.

6.

That Price Development's motion in limine regarding the loss of purchasing power
(motion no. 10 above) is taken under advisement.

7.

That Price Development's motion in limine to exclude the expert witness report and
testimony of the Smiths' witness Merrill Norman (motion no 8 above), is reserved,
and the Court will rule on the admissibility of the report and/or testimony at trial,
based upon the development of the evidence.

DATED this < 5 i 2 r d a y of March, 2001.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Honorable Frank E. Noel \
Presiding State District Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR.
of and for
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Armand L Smith and Virginia L Smith

REED L MARTINEAU
REX MADSEN
of and for
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants
Price Development Company, n/k/a
Fairfax Realty, Inc., North Plains Land Company, Ltd.,
and North Plains Development Company, Ltd.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Berman Gaufin
Tomsic Savage & Campbell, Key Bank Tower Suite 1250, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84144, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER be delivered to the following this
March, 2001 by:
[ X ] Hand Delivery
[

] Facsimile No.

[

] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[

] Federal Express

[

] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Counterclaim Defendants and Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FAIRFAX REALTY, INC., Formerly
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, NORTH PLAINS
LAND COMPANY, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, and NORTH
PLAINS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD.
a Utah limited partnership,

MINUTE ENTRY
CIVIL NO.

940904312

Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants.
vs.
ARMAND L. SMITH, Individually
and as Trustee for the Armand L.
Smith, Jr. Trust and the Shannon
S. Windham Trust, and VIRGINIA
L. SMITH,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants•

Now

before

the

Court

are

several

Motions,

including

defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion
for a New Trial or in the Alternative for a Remittitur, Objections
to Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Objections to Proposed Special
Findings in connection with the punitive damage award.
As to the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, the
Court is of the opinion that the defendants have failed to marshal
the evidence in favor of the jury's verdict, and have failed to
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MINUTE ENTRY

verdict. The Court has previously ruled that due to ambiguities in
the contract, the parties1 intent at the time the contract was
entered into would be a question of fact for the jury.

There was

evidence submitted on both sides of this issue and on the other
issues to be decided by the jury, and the Court is of the opinion
that there was sufficient evidence to support the juryfs verdict.
Accordingly, the defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict is denied.
As to the Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur, the Court has
reviewed the evidence and finds there is reasonable evidence upon
which the jury could have based its punitive damage verdict,
including evidence that Price Development failed to timely disclose
to the Smiths the execution of the contribution agreements, leading
them

to

believe

that

certain

options were

open

to

them

in

connection with the transactions surrounding the property, that the
defendants

submitted

connection

with

misleading

plaintiffs1

information

interest

to

in the

plaintiffs

REIT,

that

in
the

defendants did not make known to the Smiths the defendants' own
calculation of the plaintiffs' interest in the REIT until several
years after litigation was brought by the Smiths to obtain an
accounting,

and

that

the

Smiths

were

never

advised

by

the

defendants as to certain potential conflicts existing in connection
with the conveyance of the property to Price Development Company,
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a Maryland limited partnership.

MINUTE ENTRY

The jury could also reasonably

find that the value of the defendant as of the end of December,
1999, was $37 million.
Accordingly, the alternative Motion for a New Trial or a
Remittitur is denied.
Defendants have objected to the proposed Judgment on the
Special Verdicts and to the Special Findings of the Court on the
punitive damage verdict of the jury.

The Court has reviewed the

objections and determines that they are without merit and will deny
the same, with the exception that the following paragraphs should
be deleted from the Special Findings.
The paragraph in the Special Findings beginning, "That in the
partnership

accountings

of

1992

and

1993,

partnership

tax

deductions and partnership phantom income were wrongfully, unfairly
and improperly allocated...."

should be deleted from the Court's

Special Findings.
With regard to attorney's fees, the Court is of the opinion
that the amount charged is not excessive, and that those amounts
charged for settlement negotiations and for challenges to the
jurisdictional aspect of this case in which the defendants did
prevail, nevertheless should be awarded to the Smiths for the
reason that they clearly prevailed on this litigation and under
Utah law are entitled to all of their reasonable attorneyfs fees.
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FAIRFAX REALTY
V. SMITH

PAGE 4

MINUTE ENTRY

The Court is not willing to determine which individual Motions the
defendants,

Price

Development

Company

and

others,

may

have

prevailed upon and reduce the attorney's fees by those amounts.
As to costs, the Court is in agreement with defendants Price
Development Company, et al., and will award costs in the total
amount of $7,13 3.26. The Court has disallowed costs in the amount
of $37,803.65.
Counsel for Smiths is to prepare an additional Judgment on the
Special Verdicts which includes the supplemental

findings as

indicated by the Court, and includes an attorneyfs fee award of
$517,611.40, and $7,133.26 in costs.
Dated this

.day of June, 2000.

FRANK
DISTR
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this
2000:

Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
Attorney for Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smith
50 S. Main, Suite 1250
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0340
James E. Magleby
Attorneys for Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smith
201 S. Main, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Reed L. Martineau
Rex E. Madsen
Korey D. Rasmussen
Attorneys for Defendants Price
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
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We would submit again, your Honor, that, call it
what you will, whether it be prejudgment interest or loss of
the use of money, it's the same thing.

And as the Court

correctly pointed out in chambers, the Utah Supreme Court has
not made any exception for the prejudgment interest in the
context of a breach of fiduciary duty.

We submit it on that

basis.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Campbell.
MR. CRMPEELL: Your Honor, I will be very short.
I have the second Wernick
and I 1 11 pass that up to the Court.

case in my hand right now
But this did involve a

breach of fiduciary duty with regard to property, to real
property, two parcels of real property that were jointly held
in trust by the fiduciary and another party.

And the court

found in that case that more than seven years prior to trial
that Macks had breached his fiduciary duty with respect to the
operation of that property.
I would be happy to submit that to the Court.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thanks.

Well, it occurs to the Court that this is a case of
first impression in Utah.
fiduciary duty context.

It appears to be an exception in a

And my feeling would be, after

reviewing these, that the Supreme Court would undoubtedly rule
that if it can be shown that one has breached a fiduciarv duty
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

by misappropriating assets or money, that, in fairness and

2

equity, they should be forced to account for that money as

3

well as any profits or interest gained by the use of the

4

injured party's money.

5

this case by the plaintiffs should be allowed in order to make

6

the plaintiffs whole in event it is shown that there is a

7

breach of a fiduciary duty.

8
9
10

And that element of damage sought in

I think I will allow it.
disagrees with me —

If the Supreme Court

we f ll submit it to the jury so we can

tell on how they ruled on all the elements of damages.

11

MR. CAMPBELL:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. CAMPBELL: We have a record being made.

14

the Court like an order on that issue because it was part of a

15

Motion in Limine?
THE COURT:

16

All right, your Honor.

We ! ll deal with that in that fashion.

Yeah.

Motion in Limine, an order would be appropriate.

18

you prepare that, Mr. Campbell.

So I ! 11 have

We ! ll take a recess and bring the jury in and get

19

21

Would

I believe, since it was part of a

17

20

Thank you.

started.
(Break taken.)

22

THE COURT:

23

Let f s go back on the record.

24

MR. MADSEN:

25

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

Your Honor, may we approach the bench.
Yes, you may.
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1

INSTRUCTION NO.

4

If you find that Price Development Company has breached its
fiduciary duty to the Smiths or breached its partnership contracts,
or converted the partnership properties, you shall then award to
Smiths the damages which you find from a preponderance of the
evidence, will fairly and reasonably compensate the Smiths for the
injuries sustained.
In the case of a breach of fiduciary duty, the benefit which
Price Development Company would have derived from the breach may be
of a continuing nature up to the time of trial, and if so, the
limited partners, Smiths, will be entitled to the time value of the
monies on the amount of damages sustained by the Smiths since the
date of the breach of the fiduciary duty to the date of trial.

(25)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

H.Nov. 29,1993 Accounting

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:E>]RX OE D E V E L O P M E N T
COMPANY
35 CENTURY PARK WAY
Telephone (301) 436-3911
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115
Telecopier/Fax (801) 436-7653

F A X

T R A N S M I S S I O N

TO;

Armand Smith

COMPANY:

Armand Smith & Associates

FAX #:

(505) 769-1619

FROM:

Paul K. Mendenhail

DEPARTMENT s

Finance

NUMBER OF PAGES (excluding cover sheet);
DATE:

December 1, 1993

TIME SENT:

2035

DEPARTMENT CODE:

ffOFtM

1

40

PROJECT CODE: REIT
REMARKS:

Attached is the sheet we discussed tonight. This is only
an estimate- Please call if we can discuss this further.
PKM

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THiS FACSIMILE MESSAGE IS PRIVILEGED AND
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT
NAMED ABOVE. IF YOU ARE NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOT I if I ED THAT
ANY COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION OH DISSEMINATION OK DISTRIBUTION OF IT TO
ANYONE OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED, IF YUC HAVE
RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE
AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE ABUVE ADDRESS VIA U>5. POSTAL
SERVICE,
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^ PLAINS MRU.
J7ATIQN OF ESTIMATES VALUE
.IBS) 29,

1993

NET GPEaPTiNS INCGBE FOR THE PARTNERSHIP
LESS INTEREST FOR DEBT IF NOT PAIS OFF
LESS NE* EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC REIT
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 3 3 . 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 = (.013361; TI«£= A)
FJNDS FRCfl OPERATIONS
HESSSVE FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND WGfiKINE CAPITAL (7.51)
PAYOUT PERCENTAGE
Fl?lD£ AVAILABLE FuS DISTRIBUTION
CAPITALIZATION i&TE
SRGSS yPLL'E BEFORE DEBT REPAYMENT. PREPflYKENT P E N 3 . 7 I 3 ,
AND CFFESINB EXPENSES
LESS DE3T FEFAYJOT
LESS SCCSliED INTERS? CN DEBT
LESS ? R & W E n PENALTIES ON DET
LESS f?HTS?Ca«PfiNY LOAN PAYMENT
PLUS M?T- "EL-T ALLOCATION
LESS ! € * EXPENSES ON f € ^ DEBT (.0393 TIffia ill
LESS PUBLIC 0FFERIN8 EXPENSES
( 2 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 DIVIDED 3Y £ 9 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 - (,00300?) " ! € 3 Hi
LESS UNBEEWSi-TNG CGS7S AND EXPENSES 70 RAISE CPFITfiL TO PBV EXISTING 2 S 7
( U , W 7 , 0 0 0 DIVIDES 3Y 187,500,000 = (.08*05; T I B S I PLUS L;
ESTIMATED NET W U E GF THE PfiRTOESHIP

ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND <G HUES Q)

ESTIMATED TOTAL PfifuT^SHI? UNITS '2 DIVIDED 3Y U 3 . E 5 PE? S-AFE)
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PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

A-

L1MITED DAPTNERSH|P

35 CENTURY PARK-WAY

Via Facsimile
Original by Regular Mail

March 8, 1994

Armand L. Smith
P.O. Box 159
Clovis, New Mexico
Re:

TELEPHONE (801) 486-3911
TELECOPIER FAX (801) 486-7653

• SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115

88101

North Plains Mall

2
i

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

I^ivil No. 940904312CV

Dear Armand:
Pursuant to our conversation of Thursday February 24 you will find
enclosed the following documents:
1.

A copy of the original computation of estimated value
showing the allocation of 8,793 units in the new
operating partnership to North Plains Mall,
Your
allocation of units is based on your 15% ownership
interest (8,793 units x 15% = 1,319 units), and the
issuance of units for the principal portion of your
partner loan ($230,640 / $17.50 per unit = 13,179 units).
The combined total units allocated to you would be 14,498
units. The value of the units is initial offering price
of the REIT stock. Siibsequent_to._the^ffering^he.jy^lue
of the units will be equivalent to the value of the
publicly traded shares.

2.

A copy of the revised computation of estimated value
schedule with the full accrual of interest on the partner
loans. Based on the computation the partnership would be
allocated 2,348 units in the operating partnership. The
allocation of units based on your ownership of 15% would
be 352 units.

3.

A copy of the balance sheets and a source and application
of the due to managing general partner account for the
period from December 31, 1988 through December 31, 1992;
and

4.

A copy of the same information starting October 31, 1989,
showing the activity for the two months ending December
31, 1989.
This schedule shows the change in the
intercompany account for the general partner from the
time of the capital call which was never picked up with
the final settlement.

DSITION
CHIBIT

Based on our discussion, we would pay you the principal amount of
your partner loan in the amount of $230,640 plus allocate to you
Digitizedoperating
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben ClarkThe
Law School,
BYU.
35 2 units in the
partnership.
allocation
of the
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Armand L. Smith
March 8, 1994
Page 2
units should make the transaction non-taxable.
You should,
however, consult with your tax advisor relative to any negative
basis gains and the handling of your own personal tax
considerations. If you have specific tax questions regarding the
transaction, please call me and I will put you in touch with our
tax advisor on this transaction.
Please review the enclosed items,
call.

If you have questions, please

erply,

1^2^.
l

aul K. Mendenhall

cc:

John Price
Warren P. King
G. Rex Frazier
Martin G. Peterson

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JAN-17-1994

Q2:i5

PRICE DEVELOPMENT

P 09

PUTflTION OF ESTIMATED VALi£
mJARY 12, 1994

NET OPERATING INCTE FOR Tt€ PARD^RSHIP
LESS INTEREST FDR DEBT IF NOT PAID OFF

1,209,300
(319,200)

LESS NEU EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC REIT
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 3 3 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 = ( . 0 1 3 6 1 ) T H E A)
FUNDS FRCK 0PE3AT1CWS
RESERVE FDR CAPITOL EXPENDITURES AND WORKING CAPITAL ( & . W
PAYOUT PERCSNTAS
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION
CAPITALIIATICN RATE
6R0SS VALUE BEFORE DEBT REPAYME>rr, PREPAYMENT PENALTIES,
m OFFERING EXPENSE
LEES DEBT REPAYMENT
LESS ACCRUED INTEREST ON DEBT

/ £ s?i
aeo,100
94.00* /
a&,694
9.00%

9,296,&00

-V

(11,244,906)
(72,500)

LEES P R E P A Y S PENALTIES ON DEBT
LESS INTERCOMPANY LOAN PAYt€KT

(1,577,744)

PUIS HEii DEBT ALLOCATION

A, BOO, 000

^

(20&,±00)

'

LESS NEW EXPENSES CM £ U DEBT (.0430 T1)€S «)
LESS PUBLIC OFFSRINB EXPENDS
( 2 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 DIVIDED BY 2 £ 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 = (.009905) T I E S W
LESS UNDERWRITING COSTS AND EXPENSES TO RAISE CAPITAL TO PAY EXISTING DEBT
( 1 ^ , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 DIVIDED BY 17A, 000,000 = (,09310) T I I O I PLUS L)

(92,083) V

(747,095) ./

ESTIMATED NET VALUE OF Tfe PART>€RSHIP

153,872

ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND (S TIMES Q)

l3,a4B

ESTIMATED TOTAL PARTTOSHIP UNITS (0 DIVIDED BY 1 1 7 . 5 0 PER SHARE)

8,793

JXATIGN I F UNITS
mm
PLAINS LAND C W W Y
i^Tcg
NORTH PUTINS
DEVELOPMENT
COKWf
Digitized
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>C

PLAINS MALL
FATION OF ESTIMATED VALUE
RY 12, 1994

NET OPERATING INCOME FOR THE PARTNERSHIP

1,209,300

LESS INTEREST FOR DEBT IF NOT PAID O F

(319,200)

LESS f O EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC REIT
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 33,000,000 = (.01545) TIMES A)
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS

890,100

RESERVE FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND WORKING CAPITAL (6.9*)
PAYOUT PERCENTAGE

94.0OS
636,694

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION
9.00*

CAPITALIZATION RATE
GROSS VALUE BEFORE DEBT REPAYMENT, PREPAYMENT PENALTIES,
AND OFFERING EXPENSES
LESS DEBT REPAYMENT

9,296,600
(11,246,906)

LESS ACCRUED INTEREST ON DEBT

(72,500)

LESS PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ON DEBT
LESS INTERCOMPANY LOAM PAYMENT
PLUS NEW DEBT ALLOCATION

(1,630,916)
4,800,000

LESS NEW EXPENSES ON NEW DEBT (3,966,000 DIVIDED 95,000,000 = (.0417) TIMES M)
LESS PUBLIC OFFERING EXPENSES
(2,600,000 DIVIDED BY 262,500,000 = (.009905) TIMES H
LESS UNDERWRITING COSTS AND EXPENSES TO RAISE CAPITAL TO PAY EXISTING DEBT
(16,200,000 DIVIDED BY 174,000,000 = (.09310) TIMES I PLUS L PLUM M!

(206,400)

(92,083)

(756,700)

ESTIMATED NET VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP

41,095

ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND (G TIMES Q)

3,699
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2,348

-flINS MALL
SHEETS - TAX

12-31-88

ATE
D
LDIN6S AND IMPROVEMENTS
NITURE, FIXTURE AND EQUIPMENT
JHULATED DEPRECIATION

AND NOTES RECEIVABLE
CHARGES
JMILATED AMORTIZATION
5ETS

1,625,000
8,225,000
(1 5aa 000)

'

'

12-31-89

12-31-90

12-31-91

12-31-92

1,625,000 1,625,000
10,593,000 10,629,000

1,625,000
10,837,000

1,625,000
10,824,000

(2,136,000) (2,666,000) (3,215,000) (3,776,000)

8,262,000 10,062,000 9,588,000 9,247,000
(45,000)
21,000
3,000
2,000
3,000
11,000
2,000
460,000
589,000
594,000
582,000
(146,000) (236,000) (329,000) (359,000)

8,673,000
2,000

B. 534, OOP 10,467,000

8.847,000

9,856.000

9,474,000

498,000
(326,000)

S AND EQUITY

NflGINS GENERAL PARTNER
NTEREST PAYABLE
PAYABLE AND ACCRUED EXPENSES

DEFICIT
rY
HBUTIONS
€ (LOSS)

9,500,000
1,405.000

12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000
2,159.000
856,000 1,104,000
130,000

186,000

162,000

11,720,000
1.240,000
102,000

10,505,000 14,289,000 13,042,000 l3,26o,CK)0 13,062, 000
(1,491,000) (2,371,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000)
1,552,000
(880,000) (1,451,000) (916,000) (606,000) (423,000)
(2,371,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000) (4,215, 000)
8,534,000 10,467,000

9,856,000

9,474,000

8,847, 000
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PLAINS MALL
3 MANA6IN6 6BERflL PARTNER - SOURCE AND APPLICATION - TAX

PERIOD
TOTAL

12-31-89

12-31-90

12-31-91

12-31-92

(1,451,000)
638,000

(916,000)
623,000

(606,000)
579,000

130,000
2,500,000

56,000

(24,000)

(423,000) (3,396,000)
528,000 2,368,000
0
(60,000)
102,000
2,500,000
1,552,000

IS OF ADVANCES
NET INCOME (LOSS)

ADD BACK DEPRECIATION
INCREASE IN ACCRUED INTEREST PAYABLE
INCREASE IN ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
INCREASE IN LOAN OUTSTANDING
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION

1,552,000
1,817,000

1,315,000

(51,000)

2,368,000

36,000

208,000

129,000

5,000

(12,000)

74,000

(29,000)

1,000

45,000

3,126,000

»TION OF ADVANCES
INCREASE
INCREASE
INCREASE
INCREASE
MORTGAGE
INCREASE

IN BUILDINGS
IN FURNITURE AND FIXTURES
IN DEFERRED CHARGES
IN OTHER ASSETS
LOAN PAYMENTS
IN ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE

2,571,000

12,000

(754,000) 1,303,000 /

DURCES (APPLICATION)
4ING BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER

(1,405,000) (2,159,000)

3 BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER

(2,159,000)

(13,000) 2,599,000
0
(84,000)
38,000
0
280,000
280,000
(2,000)
44,000

197,000

181,000

(248,000)

(136,000)

2,961,000
165,000

(B56,0OO) (1,104,000) (1,405,000)

(856,000) (1,104,000) (1,240,000) (1,240,000)
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PLAINS MflLL
E SHEETS - TAX - STARTING 10-31-89

10-31-89

ITATE
iND

12-31-89

12-31-90

12-31-91

12-31-92

HLDIN6S AND IMPROVEMENTS

1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000
1,625,000
10,302,000 10,593,000 10,629,000 10,837,000 10,824,000

RNITURE, FIXTURE AKD EQUIPMENT
CUMULATED DEPRECIATION

(2,046,000) (2,136,000) (2,666,000) (3,215,000) (3,776,000)

3 AND NOTES RECEIVABLE
3 CHARGES
:iMJLATED AMORTIZATION
3SETS

9,881,000 10,082,000 9,588,000 9,247,000 8,673,000
20,000
21,000
3,000
2,000
2,000
9,000
11,000
2,000
480,000
589,000
594,000
582,000
498,000
(219,000) (236,000! (329,000) (359,000) (326,000)

10.171,000 10,467,000

9,856,000

9,474,000

8.847,000

IS AND EQUITY
GS
ANAGIN6 GENERAL PARTNER
INTEREST PAYABLE
PAYABLE AND ACCRUED EXPENSES

12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 11,720,000
1,552,000 2,159,000
B56,000 1,104,000 1,240,000
179,000

130,000

186,000

162,000

102,000

13,731,000 14,289,000 13,042,000 13,266,000 13,062,000
3 DEFICIT
ITY
rRIBUTIONS
W (LOSS)

(2,371,000) (2,371,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000)
1,552,000
(1,189,000) (1,451,000) (916,000) (606,000) (423,000)
(3,560,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000) (4,215,000)
10,171,000 10,467,000

9,856,000

9,474,000

8,847,000
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PLAINS MALL
MANAGING GENERAL PARTNER - SOURCE AND APPLICATION - TAX - STARTING 10-31-89

2 MONTHS
10-31-89

12-31-90

12-31-91

12-31-92

(262,000)
107,000

(916,000)
623,000

(606,000)
579,000

(423,000)
528,000

(49,000)

56,000

(24,000)

PERIOD
TOTAL

S Of ADVANCES
NET INCOME (LOSS)
ADD BACK DEPRECIATION
INCREASE I N ACCRUED INTEREST PAYABLE
INCREASE I N ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
INCREASE I N LOAN OUTSTANDING
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION

1,552,000

(2,207,000)
1,837,000
0
(60,000)
(77,000)
0
1,552,000

(204,000)

1,315,000

(51,000)

45,000

1,105,000

291,000

36,000

208,000

(13,000)

109,000

5,000

(12,000)

(84,000)

1,000

280,000
(2,000)

522,000
0
18,000
0
280,000
(27,000)

197,000

181,000

793,000

(248,000)

(136,000)

312,000

ATIDN OF ADVANCES
INCREASE
INCREASE
INCREASE
INCREASE
MORTGAGE
INCREASE

I N BUILDINGS
I N FURNITURE AND FIXTURES
I N DEFERRED CHARGES
I N OTHER ASSETS
LOAN PAYMENTS
I N ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE

3,000
403,000

BJRCES (APPLICATION)

(607,000)

(29,000)
12,000
1,303,000

1INB BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER

(1,552,000) (2,159,000)

i BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER

(2,159,000)

(856,000) (1,104,000) (1,552,000)

(856,000) (1,104,000) (1,240,000) (1,240,000)
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Schedule E
NORTH PLAINS MALL
COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED VALUE (FINAL) •

A.

NET OPERATING INCOME FOR THE PARTNERSHIP

B.

LESS INTEREST FOR DEBT IF NOT PAID OFF

019,200)

C

LESS NEW EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC RETT
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 33400,000-(.015361) TIMES A)

f 18,376)

D.

FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS

871,524

E.

RESERVE FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND WORKING CAPITAL (6.0H)
PAYOUT PERCENTAGE

F.

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION

G.

CAPITALIZATION RATE

H.

GROSS VALUE BEFORE DEBT REPAYMENT. PREPAYMENT PENALTIES,

1,209,300

94.00%
819,233
1*2%

AND OFFERING EXPENSES

9,508,707

L

LESS DEBT REPAYMENT

J.

LESS ACCRUED INTEREST ON DEBT

K.

LESS PREPAYMENT PENALTIES OK DEBT

L.

LESS INTERCOMPANY LOAN PAYMENT- TENANT IMPROVEMENTS

0,577,744}

M.

PLUS NEW DEBT ALLOCATION

4,800,000

N.

LESS NEW EXPENSES ON NEW DEBT (.0430 TIMES M)

(206,400)

O.

LESS PUBLIC OFFERING EXPENSES
(2,600,000 DIVIDED BY 262^00,000 -(.009905) TIMES H)
LESS UNDERWRmNG COSTS AND EXPENSES TO RAISE CAPTIAL TO PAY EXISITNGDEBT

(94,184)

P.

(11,246,906)
(72^00)

(16,200,000 DIVIDED BY 174,000,000 - (.09310) TIMES I PLUS L)

041.095)

Q.

ESTIMATED NET VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP

363.178

R.

ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND (G TIMES Q)

31.350

S.

ESTIMATED TOTAL PARTNERSHIP UNITS (Q DIVIDED BY S17J0 PER SHARE)

20.793

EFFECTIVE GROSS VALUE UTILIZED (H PLUS M MINUS N) - assurninf that the other additional
partner advance of SI ,537,600 is treated as capita] and not u a partner loan.
Prepared 1/12/2000 toDigitized
reflect the
final
valuation
and Law
unitsLibrary,
allocated
to thisClark
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Law School, BYU.
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Schedule A2
Method 1
Value of North Plains Mall Based on Mr. Howden's Appraisal on January 1, 1994
Various Treatments of Debt

Measurement of Smiths' Partnership interests as of 3/15/01
1 Value per Howden Appraisal (1/1/94)

Analysis Two

$

16,000,000
11,281,906

2 Less: Mortgage Loan Repayment
3 Value of Partnership Interests (Net of Chemical Bank Mortgage) (Line 1 less Line 2)

4,718,094

4 Less: Intercompany Loan Repayment

1,525,024

5 Less: Price Capital/Loan Repayment

1,869,751

6 Less: Smith Capital/Loan Repayment

373,297

7 Estimated Net Value of Partnership (Line 3 less Lines 4-6)

950,022
15%

8 Smiths' Ownership Percentage
9 Value of Smiths' Partnership Interests (Line 6 multiplied by Line 7) at 1/1/94

142,503

10 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Partnership interests at BankOne
Prime +2% (1/1/94 to 3/15/01)

147,470

11 Value of Smiths' Partnership Interests at 3/15/01 (Line 9 plus Line 10)

$

289,974

$

258,390

Measurement of Smiths' Debt interests as of 3/15/01
12 Beginning Loan Balance of Smiths' as of approximately January 1990
13 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Loan Balance at BankOne Prime
+2% (1/1/90 to 1/1/94)

114,907

14 Value of Smiths' Debt interests as of 1/1/94 (Line 12 plus Line 13)

373,297

15 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Loan Balance at BankOne Prime
+2% (1/1/94 to 3/15/01)

386,309

16 Value of Smith's Debt Interests as of 3/15/01 (Line 14 plus Line 15)

H

759,606

"1

1,049,579

Measurement of Smiths' Combined Partnership and Debt interests as of 3/15/01
17 Value of Smiths' Partnership and Debt Interess at 3/15/01 (Line 11 plus Line 16)
18 Plus: Legal and Expert Witness costs for claimed breach of fiduciary duties
and/or claimed breach of Partnership Contract.
19 Total Value Due Smiths' with Legal and Accounting Fees (Line 17 plus Line 19)

Footnotes:
Includes Mortgage Loan, Includes Intercompany Loan, Includes Partner Capital/Loan
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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NORTH PLAINS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
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ARTICLE 2
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS
The principal place of business of the Partnership shall be
located m

Curry County at the location of the property, with its

principal management offices being located at 35 Century Park-Way,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84115, or at such ether place as the

General Partner shall hereafter determine in writing.
ARTICLE 3
DURATION OF PARTNERSHIP
Section 3.1

Term.

The term of this Partnership snail

commence on the date hereof and continue thereafter for a period
of forty-five (45) years unless sooner terminated hereunder or by
operation of law.
ARTICLE 4
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AND OWNERSHIP INTEREST
The Partnership shall have separate capital accounts for
each Partner to which their capital contributions, if any, their
respective shares of profits or losses and any withdrawals or
distributions shall from time to time be credited or charged.
The General Partner and Limited Partners shall each contribute to the Partnership and shall initially hold an interest in
the Partnership as follows:
PARTNER

CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTION

PEPCENT

Price Development Company
(General)

$

50

5%

Price Development Company

$

150

15%

John Price

$

550

55%

Armand'L. Smith

$

150

15%

NP Investment Company

$

100

10%

$1,000

1001;

(Limited)

TOTAL
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Withdrawals of the Partnership capital will be permitted
only as directed by the General Partner and shall be in the ratio
of the above percentages.
Mo interest shall be payable on any contributions to the
capital of the Partnership.

The account of each Partner shall be

credited for ail of the Partner's contributions to the capital of
the Partnership and shall be charged for all capital contributions
withdrawn by or returned to that Partner in accordance with the
foregoing provisions.

Such credits and debits shall be made as

and when the related contributions or the withdrawals or return
of capital occur.

The Partners' accounts shall not be debited or

credited for any other transaction, including (without limitation)
any depreciation, other expense, loss, income or gain, and any
distribution to the Partners of their respective shares of income
or gain,it being the understanding of the Partners that separate
accounts shall be maintained on the books of the Partnership for
such other transactions, items, and distributions, and they shall
not be closed out to the Partners' accounts.

The words "respec-

tive contributions" or substantially identical words used in this
Agreement shall mean, unless the context clearly expresses a
different meaning, the balances standing to the credit of the
Partners in their respective capital accounts on the books of the
Partnership, unaffected by any other Partnership accounts.
ARTICLE 5
PURPOSES OF PARTNERSHIP
The purpose of the Partnership is to acquire, construct,
develop, manage, lease, and deal with regard to certain real
property (the "Land") and certain improvements to be constructed
on the Land to be known as the "North Plains Mall" (the "Project") .
The Land is located at the intersection of Mariana Boulevard and
Prince Street in the City of Clovis, Curry County, New Mexico and
is more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
The initial interest of the Partnership in the Land is that of a
leasehold estate.
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The Partnership is hereby authorized to engage in such
activities as may be incidental to the purposes statea heremancve
and to engage in such other related businesses as may be mutually
agreed upon by the Partners.
ARTICLE 6
TITLE TO ASSETS AND BANK ACCOUNTS
All real and personal property of the Partnership shall be
held m

the name of the Partnership.

All funds of the Partnership

shall be deposited in a separate bank account or accounts in the
name of the Partnership and may be withdrawn upon the signature
of the General Partner or such other person or persons as may be
designated in writing by the General Partner.
ARTICLE 7
MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND LEASING; REIMBURSEMENT
Section 7.1

General.

The General Partner shall have the

right and duty of managing the business of the Partnership,
including the duty of enforcing all of the obligations owed by
third parties to the Partnership and the General Partner shall
devote so much of its time, efforts, personnel, and resources to
the business and affairs of the Partnership as may be required
for the successful and profitable conduct thereof.

Except as

limited in this Agreement, the General Partner shall have the
exclusive control over the business of the Partnership including
the power to assign duties, hire personnel, enter into contracts
and leases, borrow money, refinance, encumber or sell all or any
part of the property, and to have full authority and control of
any and all business operations of the Partnership at the expense
of the Partnership.
Section 7 .2

Ground Lease.

The Partnership shall enter into

a Ground Lease of Pro3ect site with North Plains Land Company, a
Utah limited partnership.

The Ground Lease shall be m

the form

of that attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and by this reference made
a part hereof.

The form and content of the Ground Lease is

hereby approved by the Partners.
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Section 7.3

Management Agreemert.

The Partnership shall

enter into a Management Agreement with Price Management Company,
a Utah corporation.

The Management Agreement shall be in the

form of that attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by this reference
made a part hereof.

The form ard content of the Management

Agreement is hereby approved by the Partners and the Limited
Partners hereby waive any c l a m

respecting said Management

Agreement arising cut of the existing affiliation between the
General Partner and Price Management Company.
Section 7.4

Development Agreement,

The Partnership shall

enter into a Development Agreement with Price Development Company,
a Utah corporation.

The Development Agreement shall be in the

form of that attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this reference
made a part hereof.

The form and content of the Development

Agreement is hereby approved by the Partners and the Limited
Partners heresy waive any claim respecting said Development
Agreement arising out of Price Development Company f s status as
the Gereral Partner hereunder.
Section 7.5

Leasing Agreement.

The Partnership shall also

enter into a Leasing Agreement with Price Development Company.
The Leasing Agreement shall be in the form of that attached
hereto as

Exhibit " E " and by this reference made a part hereof.

The form and content of the Leasing Agreement is hereby approved
by the Partners anc the Limited Partners hereny waive any claim
respecting said Leasing Agreement arising out of Price Development's status as General Partner hereunder.
Section 7.6

Limited Partner Approval.

The Limited Partners

shall not have nor exercise any management right whatsoever
except as herein provided.

The General Partner, however, shall

not, without the written consent or ratification by ninety
percent

(90°o) m

interest of the Limited Partners do any of the

following acts:
1.

Do any act m

contravention of the Certificate of

Limited Partnership.
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2.

Confess a judgment against the Partnership.

3.

Possess Partnership property, or assign specific

Partnership property, for other than a Partnership purpose.
4.

Except as otherwise provided m

Articles 12 ana

13, admit a person or entit\ as a General Partner.
The dissolution or witndrawal of a General Partner shall net
dissolve the Partnership and m

such event the Partnership may be

continued b^ any then remaining General Partner(s) or by a person
or entity selected by unanimous agreement of the Limited Partners,
if there is not then a remaining General Partner.
Section 7.7

Management Compensation; Reimbursement.

The

General Partner shall receive as compensation for its services as
manager of the Partnership affairs, (I) reimbursement for any and
all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the General Partner on
behalf of the Partnership and (n) a reasonable hourly rate of
compensation for the time devoted by the General Partner's
various personnel m

furthering the Partnership's business, not

to exceed, however, a rate of compensation which would be charged
by third parties for performing similar services.

In no event,

however, shall the General Partner or its affiliates be compensated hereunder for any services which are covered by the agreements described in Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 (so long as such
agreements remain in effect) except to the extent set forth in
sucn agreements.
Section 7.8
(a)

Conflict of Interest.

The General Partner, the Limited Partners, and

their respective affiliates (including the respective directors,
officers, and employees of each) may engage for their own account
and/or for the account of others in other business ventures,
including the purchase, developrent, operation, management, or
syndication of real estate properties, eitner for tneir own
respective or collective accounts or on behalf of otner persons,
partnerships, joint ventures, corporations, or other entities

m

which they may have an interest, whether or not competitive with,
or m

a conflict of interest position with, the Partnership.
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a Partner engages m

such activities, the Partnership ana the

other Partners shall have no right to participate therein or make
any claim as a result thereof.
(b)

The General Partner may, with disclosure to the

Limited Partners, deal with itself, and with its affiliates,
their officers, employees, ana agents m
services or goods for the Partnersnip

providing necessary

(provided the cost of such

goods or services is equal to or less than the cost of o b t a i m n a
such goods or services from thirc parties) and neither the
Partnership nor any of the Limited Partners shall have any right
by virtue of this Agreement, to participate m

or to claim any

interest in the income or profits derived therefrom.
(c)

Each Partner waives any rights such Partner may

have against any other Partner for capitalizing on information
and/or opportunities learned as a consequence of any connection
with the affairs of this Partnership.
ARTICLE 8
COMPENSATION OF PARTNERS
Except as expressly provided for m

this Agreement, or

m

the Management Agreement, Leasing Agreement, or Development
Agreement: referred no m

Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5, a Partner

shall not receive any compensation

(other than its respective

share of profits) for any services which such Partner may perform
for the Partnership.
ARTICLE 9
ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PARTNERSHIP AND DISTRIBUTIONS
Section 9.1.

Financing.

No financing obtained by the

Partnersnip shall impose any personal liability on any Limitea
Partner or any affiliated entity of the Partnership without the
written approval of the Partner(s) or entity personally liable
therefor.
Section 9.2
(a)

Capital Calls.

The Partnership shall attempt to obtain financing

for Digitized
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the Project in the form of an initial land loan (the "Land Loan")
at the time the Land is acquired by the Partnership, a subsequent
construction loan at the time construction of improvements on the
Land commences

(the "Construction Financing") and a perranent

mortgage loan or other similar financing (the "Permanent Financing") dpcrt the completion of sucn construction.

If during tne

term of this Partnership, the Construction Financing, Permanent
Financing, or gross cash receipts generated by the Partnership
are not sufficient to provide working capital to meet the current
obligations or other cash needs of the Partnership, the Partnership shall use all reasonable efforts to borrow, from recognized
and reputable lending sources, the funds needed to meet such
obligations and/or cash needs on the strength of the Partnership's
assets (and not necessarily on the strength of the net worth of
the General Partner); it being the intent of the Partners to
borrow the maximum amount of funds as the Pro]ect is able to
sustain through first and/or second mortgages

(first and/or

second deeds of trust), so-called "gap" loans or other interimtype financing as is reasonably prudent under the circumstances
and is consistent with industry practice, including, if possible,
bonds, grants, and other financing arranged through municipal,
state and/or federal agencies.
(b)

The General Partner shall use its best efforts to

obtain for the Partnership the Land Loan, the Construction
Financing, the Permanent Financing, ana additional interim, "gap"
or "second" loans and bonds and grants as are described in
Section 9.2(a) above at such rate of interest anc for such
principal amounts as the General Partner deems appropriate. The
General Partner shall also utilize its best efforts to obtain the
Permanent Financing on terms as shall impose no personal liability
on the Partnership or tne Partners or any affiliated entities,

m

that the lender of such Permanent Financing shall lock solely to
the value of the Project for its security.
(c)

In the event that the Partnership is unable to

borrow all necessarv funds, then each Partner shall loan or
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advance such additional needed funds to the Partnership in the
proportion to its then respective Partnership interest.

An^ such

loans or advances shall be paid to the Partnership within such
period after notice as the General Partner may specify by written
notice to the Partners [but in no event to be less than ten (10)
days].

Any such loans or advances by a Partner shall be reflected

on the bocks of the Partnership as a loan, bearing interest at
the rate of two (2) percentage points over the prime rate of
interest then being charged by Valley Bank and Trust Company,
Salt Lake City, Utah, but in no event shall such interest
the maximum permissible interest rate chargeable at law.

exceed
The

prime rate of interest in effect on the first day of any calendar
month shall apply for such calendar month.

A Partner as such

lender shall, as against the Partnership, have all the rights of
a general creditor against the interests of the other Partners in
the Partnership.

Said advances or loans to the Partnership

together with accrued interest thereon shall be repaid m

a luce

amount and at the same time and prior to any distribution of Net
Spendable to any General Partner as provided for in Article 11
hereof.
(d)

Should any Partner fail to make all or any part of

the loan or advance required of it under Section 9.2(c) next
above on a timely basis (the "Defaultma Party") any other party
(tne "Curing Party") may elect, but shall not be obligated, to
lend or advance to the Partnership [in addition to the amount
required of it pursuant to Section 9.2(c)] that portion of such
loan or advance w m c h the Defaulting Party failed to make (the
"Curing Amount") .

Commencing on the date such loan or advance

was needed by the Partnersnip and continuing thereafter, the
Defaulting Party shall be indebted to the Curing Party in the
Curing Amount, which Amount shall bear interest at the rate per
annum equal to three ana one/half (3h) percentage points above
the prime rate of interest charged by Valley Bank and Trust
Company, Salt Lake City, Utah; provided that in no event shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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such interest rate exceed

the maximum interest rate permitted by

lav*. Such indebtedness shall be secured by the Defaulting
Party's interest in the Partnership and shall remain an obligation
of the Defaulting Party until such obligation is either
satisfied in full by the payment m

d)

cash of the Curing Amount

plus all accrued interest or in) satisfied by an appropriate
adjustment to the relative interests of the parties in the
Partnership as is more fully described below.

The interest rate

described above shall be determined as of the first day of each
calendar month and such rate, as so calculated, shall remain in
effect for such month.

All unpaid interest outstanding on the

last day of each calendar year shall be added to the principal of
the Curing Amount and shall bear interest thereafter to the same
extent as the Curing Amount.

If the Defaulting Party has not

paid to the Curing Party the entire Curing Amount described
above, together with all accrued interest, within ninety (90)
days of the date such Curing Amount was needed by the Partnership,
the Curing Party may, at any time thereafter, elect to convert
the then outstanding Curing Amount, together with all unpaid
interest, into an increased interest in the Partnership.

Such

conversion shall be at the rate of one percent (1%) of Partnership
interest for each Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) then owed
by the Defaulting Party to the Curing Party if notice of such
conversion can and is given on or before the fourth anniversary
of the grand opening of the Project.

Such conversion shall be at

the rate of one percent (io) of Partnership interest for each
Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) then owed by the Defaulting
Party to the Curing Party if notice of such conversion is given
after the fourth anniversary of the grand opening of the Project.
Such election to so convert shall be maae in writing and may be
given at any time following the ninety (90) day period described
above as long as any sums are then due the Curing Party under
this Section 9.2(d).

Following receipt by the Defaulting Party

of any such notice to convert, the Defaulting Party shall
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have ten (10) business days in wnich to pay in cash all or a
portion of the Curing Amount and, if all or a portion of such sum
is not paid within such ten (10) days, the relative interests of
the parties shall be immediately and automatically adiusted to
reflect the conversion described above of the total amount not so
paid.

For example, if a Defaulting Party owes a Curing Party One

Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($100,000.00) as a Curing
Amount together with Twenty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($20,000.00)
in interest and the ninety (90) day and ten (10) day periods
described above have expired without payment prior to the fourth
anniversary of the grand opening of the Shopping Center, the
interest of the Curing Party in the Partnership would be automatically increased by six percent (6%) and the interest of the
Defaulting Party automatically decreased by six

percent (6%).

In addition, the capital account of the Curing Party shall be
increased by the Curing Amount ($100,000.00 in the above
example), which Curing Amount was previously paid by the Curing
Party to the Partnership under this Section 9.2(d).

In the

alternative to the conversion election described above, the
Curing Party may elect to convert the Curing Amount into a demand
loan to the Partnership bearing interest from the date the Curing
Amount was paid to the Partnership at the rate of tnree and
one-half percantage points (3*5%) over the prime rate of Valley
Bank and Trust as described above.

Such loan shall be treated as

any other loan (except as to interest rate) made by a Partner to
the Partnership under this Agreement and such loan, together with
all accured interest, shall be repaid prior to the payment of any
capital or net spendable to the Partners as described in Article
11 and 14.

In no event shall the Defaulting Party be liable,

beyond its Partnership interest, for the Curing Amount.
(e)

In the event that more than one (1) Partner

desires to participate as a Curing Party, such participation
shall be undertaken pro rata, based upon the respective Partner-
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ship interests of tne Curing Parties, ana all rignts granted
hereunder to Curing Parties may be exercised severally ana
individually by eacn of such Curing Parties.
Section 9.3

Fepatmeat of Loans.

The Partnership shall not

repay anv loans made by the Partners or make any distributions to
tne Partners except as hereinafter provided.

Before any porticr

of such loans are repaid or any other distributions are made tc
the Partners, all expenses of operation shall be paid, all
amounts currently due at such time on outstanding loans from
persons other than the Partners shall be paid, and adequate
provision shall be made for the working capital requirements of
the Partnership, including adequate reserves for maintenance,
management, prcmotion, ana tax expenses.

One hundred percent

(100%) of all cash becoming available for distribution to the
Partners shall be paid to the Partners m

repayment of their

loans to the Partnership until such loans have been repaid in
full.

All other distributions shall be made to the Partners

m

proportion to their ownership interests.
Section 9.4

Interest on Loans to Partnership.

Any funds

loaned to the Partnership DV a Partner, or advances on behalf of
the Partnership ov a Partner, snail be repaid to such Partner oy
the Partnership as prcviaed for m

Sections 9.2 and 9.3.

Such

loans or advances snail bear interest at the rate of two (2)
percentage points (or tnree and one-half percentage points [3^o]
m

the case of a loan arising pursuant to Section 9.2(d)) over

the then existing prime rate of interest chargec by Valley Bank &
Trust Company, Salt Lake City, Utah; providea, however, in no
event shall the rate of sucn interest exceed the maximum rate
permitted by law.
Section Q.5

Notice of Borrowings.

The General Partner

shall advise the Limited Partners of any significant borrowings
by the Partnership.

The General Partner shall also not enter

into any agreement for recourse permanent financing or the
guarantee of permanent financing either by the General Partner as
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an individual or in its General Partner capacity without first
notifying the Limited Partners and affording them the opportunity
to become obligatec for the repayment of such financing.
ARTICLE 10
ACCOUNTING
Section 10.1

Supervision.

Proper and complete books of

account of the business of the Partnership shall be kept by or
under the supervision of the General Partner at the principal
management offices of the Partnership and shall be open to
inspection or audit by any Limited Partner or by its accredited
representative at any reasonable time during normal business
hours.

Any expense for such audit or review shall be borne by

the Partner making such audit or review.
Section 10.2

Accounting Records; Annual Financial Statement.

The Partnership records shall be maintained using such method of
accounting as the General Partner may select m
accounting principles commonly used m
approved by the General Partner.

accordance with

the industry and in a form

Within ninety (90) days after

the enc of each fiscal year, the General Partner shall furnish to
the Limited Partners financial statements for the year just
expired.

The books ana records of account shall be used by the

General Partner's accounting personnel and/or a firm of mcependent public accountants selected by the General Partner, to
prepare sucn financial statements, which shall be prepared in
accordance with accounting principles commonly used in the
industry.
Section 10.3

Tax Returns.

The General Partner shall

prepare the Partnership's federal and state tax returns.

The

General Partner agrees to use its best efforts to cause said
returns and related tax information to be furnished to the
Partners on or before April 1 of each calenaar year.

For purposes

of this Article 10, the fiscal year of the Partnership shall be
the calendar year.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NPD
Partnership Agreement

Section 10.4

Semi-Annual Reports.

In addition to the

Annual Statement and tax information describea above, the General
Partner shall also, within one hundred twenty (120) days following
the close of the first six months of each fiscal year, furnish
the Limited Partners with a receipts and disbursements report ror
such six-month pence.

Additional receipts anc disbursements

reports on an unaudited and informal basis shall be provided to
the Limited Partners from time to time (but not more often tnan
monthly), upon request of Limited Partners holding at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the ownership interest m

the

Partnership.
Section 10.5

Information.

In addition to the accounting

and tax reports described herein, the General Partner shall also
keep the Limited Partners informed as to the general business
activities of the Partnership.
ARTICLE 11
PROFITS AND LOSSES; DISTRIBUTIONS; CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS
Section 11.1

Profits and Losses.

Subject to the provisions

of Article 12, the Net Spendable (as hereinafter defined) as well
as Taxable Net Income (as hereinafter defined) of the partnersnip
shall be allocated in accordance with the respective Partners'
ownership interests.
Section 11.2

Net ScQndacle.

As between tne Partners ana

notwithstanding the definitions of "Taxable Net Income" for tax
purposes set fcrtn m

Section 11.4, and "Profit and Less" for

financial purposes set forth in Section 11.3, tne Partners*agree
that Net Spendable snail mean the gross casn receipts generated
by the Partnersnip from all sources (exclusive of receipts
referred to in Section 11.6) less all expenditures in connection
with the business of the Partnership, including the payment of
principal and interest on all loans, the payment of all expenses
of operation, and the establishment of reasonaole reserve for
maintenance, management, promotion, capital, and other expenses.
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Section 11.3

Profit and Less.

The term Proi.it ana Loss

shall mean the prorits and losses of the Partnership as determined
by the General Partner's accounting personnel and/or the accounting firm, if any, employed by the Partnership for the preparation
of the financial statements referrea to in Section 10.2.
Section 11.4

Taxaole MPT: Income.

Tne term "Taxaole Net

Income" shall mean the net income or net loss of the Partnership
as determined by the General Partner at the close of each fiscal
year and reportea on the Partnership information tax return filed
for federal income tax purposes.

The rate and method of deprecia-

tion to be utilized by the Partnership shall be determined by the
General Partner and each Partner's share of the Taxable Net
Income as reported on the Partnership tax returns shall be
prorated among the Partners in accordance with their respective
ownership interests.
Section 11.5

Distribution.

Distributions of Net Spendable

shall be made to the Partners within thirty (30) days after the
end of each fiscal quarter of the Partnership or at the end of
each such ether period of time as the General Partner shall
determine.

In no event, however, shall distributions of Net

Spendable be made less often than once per fiscal year.
Section 11.6

Applications ot Proceeds of Capital Transac-

tions . The net proceeas or a sale, conaemnation, or otner
disposition of all or any part of the property of the Partnership,
the net proceeas of any borrowing by the Partnership in excess of
the capital requirements of the Partnership, and any insurance
proceeds m

excess of the costs of restoration, shall be distri-

buted to the Partners in proportion to each respective Partner's
ownership interest.
ARTICLE 12
ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL PARTNERS
The Partners recegmze that it may be necessary or desirable
to admit additional partners, limited or general, to the PartnerDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ship, or enter into a joint venture with others, for the purposes
of providxng loans, additional capital, key tenant participation
in the Project, or for other purposes.

In sue* evert the General

Partner shall negotiate the value to be received ana the otner
terms ana conditions upon which such additional partners shall be
admitted or the terms ana conditions of such joint venture, as
the case may be; which terms and conditions, as to a person or
entity not affiliated with any partner, shall be subject to the
prior approval of Limited Partners holding at least fift^-one
percent (51%) of the total limited partnership interests, which
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed and which
approval from each Limited Partner shall be deemed given if no
response is received from such Limited Partner within fifteen
(15) business days following delivery to it of the terms and
conditions so requiring its approval.

The terms and conditions

for admitting as a partner a person or entity affiliated with any
existing partner shall be subject to the approval of Limited
Partners holding at least nmty-five percent (95%) of the total
Limited Partnership interests.

In the event additional partners

are admitted to the Partnership hereunder, the interest of the
General Partner and Limited Partners m
reduced proportionately m
ownership interests.

this Partnership shall be

tne ratio of their then existing

In the event the Partnership enters into a

joint venture with others, the interest of the General and
Limited Partners m

the Partnership's land (or development

thereon) shall be reduced accordingly.
APTICLE 13
TRANSFERS
Section 13.1

Transfer of Partnership Interest.

A Partner

may not sell, assign, transfer, or encumber his or its interest
m

the Partnership, whether by operation of law or otherwise,

except as hereinafter provided in this Article 13.
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Section 13.2
provided m

Right of First Refusal.

Except as otherwise

Article 12 or this Article 13, if a Partner (the

"offeror") receives a bona fide offer for the purchase of all or
any portion of such Partner's interest in the Partnership, which
offer such Partner is willing to accept, such Partner shall
submit a true copy of said offer, which shall disclose the name
and address of the proposed purchaser, to the other Partners (the
"offerees"), and offer to sell such Partner's interest in the
Partnership to the offerees for the price and on the terms set
forth therein.

The offerees shall thereupon have the absolute

right to purchase the interest of the offeror on the terms and
conditions set forth in such offer.

The offerees shall specify

in a notice to the offeror, sent within thirty (30) days of
receipt of such offer, whether or not they desire to accept the
offer of sale.

In any event the offerees must agree to purchase

the entire interest of the offeror which is offered for sale, or
reject such offer.

Should some of such offerees elect to accept

such offer and other elect to reject such offer, the accepting
offerees may proceed to purchase the interest of the offeror.
The accepting offerees shall purchase such interest on a pro rata
basis in accordance with their then interests in the Partnership.
Failure to send such notification within thirty (30) days shall
constitute an election to reject such offer.

Upon rejection of

such offer by all of the offerees, the offeror may sell its
interest to the proposed purchaser whose name and address were
disclosed in said offer, but only upon the same terms and conditions set forth in said offer and within ninety

(90) days after

the rejection of such offer by the offerees; otherwise, such sale
may not be made, and any purported sale not in accoraance herewith
shall be null and void.
Section 13.3

Specific Performance.

The failure or refusal

to comply with any or ail of the provisions of this Article 13
shall entitle a Partner to specific performance of the terms,
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covenants, and conditions of this Agreement, or any part hereof,
in addition to any and all other remedies available at law.
Section 13.4

Interest of Partner.

An^ Partner may have a

direct or indirect interest in any orfer submitted for the
purchase of his or its Partnership interest or the property
provided that such Partrer discloses the extent of his or its
interest, direct or indirect, to the other Partners
Section 13.5.

Restrictions.

Until the Project has been

constructed, the provisions of Section 13.2 above shall not be
operative and no Partner shall be entitled to transfer its
interest or cause a sale of the Project during such period
without the unanimous written consent of all Partners.
Section 13.6.

Permitted Transfers bv General Partner.

Notwithstanding the limitations set forth m
elsewhere m

this Article 13 or

this Agreement, the General Partner shall have the

right at any time without the consent of its Partner(s) to sell,
assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest

m

this Partnership (i) to any corporation or other entity with
which the General Partner merges or consolidates, or which
succeeds to all or a substantial portion of the assets of the
General Partner by reason of any reincorporation, reorganization
(except under the provisions of any bankruptcy law) , or acquisition of all or substantially all of the capital stock, or assets
of the General Partner, (n) to any legal entity in which the
General Partner owns a majority equity interest (a "subsidiary")
or which owns a majority equity interest m
(a "parent") or m

the General Partner

which a majority equity interest is owned by

ar entity owning a majority equity interest; in the General
Partner, (in) to any legal entity m

which the General Partner

owns an equity interest provided the General Partner agrees

m

writing, concurrently with such sale, assignment, or transfer,
for the benefit of its Partner(s) to remain directly (financially
and otherwise) responsible for the performance of the General
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Partner's obligations under this Agreement, or (IV) to any
financial institution as security or collateral for an^ loan the
General Partner ma^ now have or hereafter obtain from any such
financial institution.
Section 13.7

Permitted Transfer of Limited Partner.

Notwithstanding trie aftove provisions of tins Article 13, any
Limited Partner may:
1.

Assign such Limited Partner's interest in the

property to another legal entity in which such Limited Partner
owns a majority interest provided the assigning party retains
sole and exclusive authority to act for such legal entity, the
same as if the assigning party were the sole owner and, provided
further, that such legal entity irrevocably appoints in writing
the assigning party as its general agent with full and exclusive
authority to act for and bind it, and delivers an original,
executed document of such appointment in recordable form to the
other party and to the General Partner.
2.

Give, sell, convey m

all or any part of its interest m

trust, or otherwise transfer

the property to a spouse,

child, or child of any child of the assigning Limited Partner;
provided that any transferee or transferees shall first designate
and empower tne transferring party or some other one person to
act for and on their collective behalf in all matters affecting
and relating to the holding, developing, operating, leasirg, ana
management of the interest so transferred.
Section 13.8

Successor to Limited Partner.

A party,

including an existing Limited Partner, who becomes a successor to
the interest of a Limited Partner shall have no right to become a
substituted Limited Partner without first obtaining the written
consent of the General Partner, which consent shall not be
unreasonably witnnela.

Tne cost of filing an amenaed Certificate

of Limited Partnership shall be paid by sucn substituted Limited
Partner.

Such a successor when approved by the General Partner
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shall become a substituted Limited Partner when the Certificate
of Limited Partnership is amended pursuant to the Utah Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, which amendment shall be accomplished by
the General Partner as soon as is reasonably possible.
ARTICLE 14
TERMINATION AND DISSOLUTION
With the unanimous consent of the Limited Partners the
General Partner shall have the right at any time to terminate the
Partnership and order the distribution of the Partnership assets.
Otherwise the Partnership shall continue (i) until all of the
interests in properties acquired by it and other investments made
by it have expired, have been sold or disposed of, or have been
abandoned; or ( n ) unless sooner dissolved, but only upon the
occurrence of any of the following events:
(a)

At any time after the first anniversary of the

grand opening of the Project, the Partners, including the General
Partner, owning more than seventy-five percent (75%) of the
Partnership interests may elect to dissolve the Partnership or
sell the Partnership assets;
(b)

The dissolution

(except by way or merger, consolida-

tion or corporate reorganization) or withdrawal of the General
Partner and the failure of the remaining Partners to elect to
continue the Partnership as provided in Section 7.6; it b e m a
understood, however, that the General Partner may not withdraw
prior to the grand opening of the Project without the unanimous
consent of the Limited Partners;
(c)

The disposition of all of the Partnership's

interest in real estate and other Partnersnip assets;
(d)

The dissolution of the Partnersnip by judicial

decree or operation of law;
(e)

The expiration of forty-five (*5)

years from the

date of initial formation of the Partnersnip, unless the Partners
unanimously agree to extend the term of the Partnership.
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In the event of dissolution and final termination, the
General Partner shall wind up the affairs of the Partnership and
shall sell ali of the Partnership assets as promptly as is
consistent with obtaining the fair market value thereof.

The

Partners shall share in the profits and losses of the business
during dissolution in the same proportions in which they shared
such profits and losses prior to dissolution.

So long as the

General Partner shall devote adequate time to the dissolution and
termination of the Partnership business, it shall receive compensation during such period at the same rate as it received immediately prior to dissolution.
Any cash remaining after all Partnership assets have been
sold shall be paid out and distributed in the following order of
priority:
(a)

Payment to creditors of the Partnership in the

order of priority provided by law?
(b)

Payment to Partners for loans, advances, or

payables owed them by the Partnership;
(c)

Payment to all Partners pro rata in repayment of

their capital accounts;
(d)

Payment of the balance to the record owners of

Partnership interests in proportion to their respective ownership
interests.
Each Partner shall look solely to the assets of the Partnership for the return of his investment.

If the Partnership

property remaining after the payment or discharge of the debts
and liabilities of the Partnership is not sufficient to return
the investment of each Partner, such Partner shall have no
recourse against the General Partner, its officers, employees,
and directors or any other Partner.
Any property distributions in kind in a liquidation shall be
valued and treated as though the property were sold and cash
proceeds distributed.
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ARTICLE 15
DEFAULTS
Subject to the previsions of Section 9.2 above, a Partner
shall be deemed for all purposes of this Agreement to be in
default hereunder in the event any such Partner:

(a) fails to

perform or observe any of its obligations under this Agreement
and such failure continues uncured for ten (10) days after
written notice thereof from any other Partner; provided, however,
that if the nature of such default is other than the failure to
pay, loan, or advance money and the same cannot reasonably be
cured within such ten (10) day period, such Partner shall not be
deemed to be in default if it shall, within such period, commence
such curing and thereafter diligently prosecute the same to
completion; (b) institutes proceedings under any laws of the
United States or of any state for the relief of debtors, files a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or for an arrangement or reorganization or is adjudicated to be insolvent or bankrupt, makes an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or consents to the
appointment of a receiver of any substantial portion of its
assets or all or any portion of its assets or all or any part of
any interest it may have in the Partnership; (c) suffers (i) to
be seized by receiver, trustee or other officer appointed by any
court or any sheriff, constable, marshal, or other similar
government officer, under color of legal authority, any substantial portion of its assets or all or any part of any interest it
may have in this Partnership and (ii) to be held in such officer's
possession for a period of thirty (30) days cr longer; or (d)
fails to secure the dismissal within sixty (60) days of any
petition in bankruptcy or reorganization filed against it pursuant
to any provision of any laws of the United States or any state
for the relief of debtors.
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ARTICLE 16
REMEDIES FOR DEFAULT
In the event of any Partner's default as defined in Article
15, at any tiire thereafter so long as the defaulting Partner
shall continue to be in default, the Partners which are not then
in default may terminate this Agreement and dissolve the Partnership in the manner prescribed in Article 15 hereof, or may
exercise any otner remedies they may have m

law or equity.

ARTICLE 17
CERTIFICATE OF FICTITIOUS NAME? OTHER FILINGS
Upon the execution of this Agreement or a subsequent change
in the membership of this Partnership, the Partners shall sign,
cause to be filed and published in the county in which the
principal place of business of the Partnership is situated, and
in each county where it transacts business, a Certificate of
Fictitious Name as required by the applicable provisions of the
laws of the states m

which such counties are located.

From time

to time, the Partners shall sign, acknowledge, record, and
publish such other notices, certificates, statements, or other
instruments required by any provision of law governing the
formation of this Partnership or its conduct of business, including, but not limited to, tne Certificate of Limited Partnership
described below, the designation of a registered office, and/or
the appomtmert of an agent for service of process.
ARTICLE 18
CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Upon the execution of this Agreement and upon a subsequent
change in the membersnip of this Partnership, the Partners shall
sign, acknowledge, and verify a Certificate of Limited Partnership
or amencment thereto pursuant to the provisions of the laws of
the State of Utah.

They shall thereafter cause a copy of such

Certificate or amendment to be filed in the office of the County
Clerk of Salt Lake County, Utah, the county in which the principal
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management office of the Partnership is located and shall cause
such recorded Certificate or amendment cr a certified copy
thereof to be recorded m
tal official m

the office of the appropriate governmen-

each county in which the Partnership has a place

of business or owns real property.
ARTICLE 19
ATTORNEYS' TEES AND COSTS
In the event of any legal proceeding involving the interpretation or enforcement of the rights or ooligations of the Partners
hereunder, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to
recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
ARTICLE 20
NOTICES
All notices, statements, demands, or other communications
(herein referred to as "notices") to be given under or pursuant
to thxs Agreement shall be in writing, addressed to the Partners
at their respective addresses as provided in Article 1 and shall
be delivered in person or by certified or registered mail,
postage prepaid, return receipt requested, or by telegraph or
cable, charges prepaid.

Any sucn notice shall be deemed given

only upon actual delivery to the addressee of such notice or upon
the date of refusal to accept such delivery by sucn addressee.
Any Partner may from time to time change its adaress for receipt
of notices by sending a notice to the other Partners specifying a
new address.
ARTICLE 21
PARTITION
No Partner shall have the right to partition any property of
the Partnership during the term ot this Agreement nor shall any
Partner make application to any court or authority having jurisdiction m

the matter or commence or prosecute any action or

proceeding for partition or the sale thereof and, upon any breach
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of the provisions of this Article by any Partner, the other
Partners m addition to all rights and remedies in law and in
equity shall be entitled to a decree or order restraining and
enjoining such application, action, or proceeding.
ARTICLE 2 2
VOID OR UNENFORCEABLE TER*S
In the event any provision of this Agreement shall be held
to be illegal or unenforceable or inoperative as a matter of law,
the remaining provisions shall remain m

full force and effect.

ARTICLE 23
UTAH LAW TO CONTROL
This Agreement shall be construed m

accordance with, and

the Partnership shall be governed by, the laws of the State of
Utah.
ARTICLE 24
CONSENT AND APPROVAL
Section 24.1

Consent.

In any instance in which any Partner

shall be requested to consent to or approve of any matter with
respect to which such Partner's consent or approval is required
by any of the provisions of this Agreement, such consent or
approval shall be given m

writing, and shall not be unreasonably

withheld.
Section 2^.2

Exercise of Approval Rights.

Wherever in this

Agreement approval of any Partner is required, and unless a
different time limit is provided herein, such approval or disapproval shall be given within thirty (30) days following the
receipt of the item to be so approved or disapproved, or the same
shall, except as hereinafter provided, by conclusively deemed to
have been approved by sucn Partner; providea that any notice to
which a Partner must respond within a limited period of time must
direct the addressee's attention (by a statement which is underlined or in capital letters) to the applicaDle time limitation,
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failing which the time limitation shall be as herein provided.
Any disapproval shall specify with particularity the reasons
therefor.

ARTICLE 25
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
Each Partner warrants and represents the following:
(a)

That he recognizes tnat Section 4(2) of the

Securities Act of 1933, as amended, exempts the issue and sale of
securities from registration under such Act in transactions not
involving any public offering, ana that he is acquiring his
Partnership interest for his own account to be owned solely by
him, for investment, and with no present intention of distributing,
reselling, pledging, or otherwise disposing of his interest;
(b)

That he is fully familiar with the business

proposed to be conducted by the Partnership and with the Partnership's use and proposed use of the proceeds of the sale of the
Partnership interests, ana has been given access at all reasonable
times to all data, records, and other information available to
the Partnership;
(c)

That he has been advised that his Partnership

interest may not be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of
without an effective registration statement covering said interest
under the Securities Act of 1933 ana applicable state securities
acts, unless registration is not required under sucn acts, and
that he will have no rights to require registration of his
interest under such acts, and, in view of the nature of the
transaction, registration is neither contemplated nor likely;
(d)

That he is knowledgeable and experienced in

financial and business matters and is capaole of evaluating the
merits and risks of this investment, and that where necessary, he
has employed and consulted with knowledgeable third persons in
making this investment decision;
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(e)

That any unauthorized assignment or transfer, or

attempted assignment or transfer, of a partnership interest shall
be void ab initio.
AFTICLE 26
MISCELLANEOUS
Section 26.1

Agreement in Counterparts.

This Agreement anc

the Statement of General Partnership may be executed in several
counterparts and upon execution shall constitute one agreement,
binding on the parties hereto, notwithstanding that all are not
signatory to the original or the same counterparts.
Section 26.2

Amendment.

This Agreement may be amended by

an agreement of all of the Partners at any time during the
continuance of the Partnership.

The Agreement may be amended or

modified in whole or in part, but any amendment or modification
shall be in writing and signed by all of the Partners.

Any

amendment or modification of this Agreement shall be dated, and
where any conflict arises between the provisions of said amendment
or modification and provisions incorporated m

earlier documents,

the most recent provisions shall be controlling.

It shall not be

necessary to revise the entire Partnership Agreement where only
minor changes are affectea, ana alterations shall be permitted
either on the face of this instrument, by way of addendum, or m
an entirely new document, providing only that sucn alteration
shall be dated and the signature of each of the Partners shall
appear in reasonable proximity to such alteration.
Section 26 .3

Cross-Indemnification.

No Partner shall have

authority to act for or to assume any obligation or responsibility
on behalf of the other Partners except as expressly provided
herein or by written agreement: signed by each of the Partners.
Each Partner agrees to indemnify, defend, ana hold harmless the
other Partners, including where applicable the directors, officers,
employees, and agents of a corporate Partner, from and against
any and all losses, claims, expenses, damages, and liabilities
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arising out of any sucn act of or any such assumption not made
pursuant to authorization expressly granted under this Agreement
or pursuant to written approval of tne Partner(s) against whom
such losses, claims, expenses, damages, or liabilities are
asserted.
Section 26.4
contained m

Force Maieure.

Motwicnscanamg anything

this Agreement, except for any obligation to pay,

loan, or advance any sums of money unaer the provisions of this
Agreement, a Partner shall be excused from performing any obligation or undertaking proviaea in this Agreement, and any delay in
the performance of any obligation under this Agreement shall be
excused, in the event and/or so long as the performance of such
obligation is prevented, delayed, retarded, hindered, or prohibited by Act of God, fire, earthquake, flood, explosion, actions
of the elements, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, mob violence,
sabotage, malicious mischief, inability to procure, or unavailability of, or general shortage of lanor, equipment, facilities,
materials or supplies in the open market, failure of transportation, strikes, lockouts, action of labor unions or trade organizations, condemnation, pending litigation or appeal thereof or
therefrom, laws or orcers of any government authority whatever,
whether civil, military, naval, environmental, municipal, state
or federal authority, or any otner cause (financial inability
excepted), whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, not
within the control of such Partner, respectively.
Section 26.5

Entire Agreement.

Except as described in

Section 26.7 below, this Agreement sets forth the entire
agreement among the Partners with regard to the subject matter
hereof and may not be amended, modified, superseded, or cancelled
except as hereinabove provided.

Any waiver of any of the

provisions of this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be
executed by the Partners in the same manner as provided for
amendments hereto.

No waiver of the failure of anv Partner
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hereto to complv with any of the provisions of this Agreement
shall be construed to be a waiver of an} other failure of compliance by such Partner with the same or otner provisions of this
Agreement.

The rights and remedies gi^en to a Partner by this

Agreement shall be deemed to be cumulative and none of such
rights and remedies shall be exclusive of any of the others, or
of any other rignt or remedy at law or in equity, and no exercise
of one right or remedy shall impair standing to exercise any
other right or remedy.

All arrangements, covenants, represen-

tations, and warranties, express and implied, oral and written,
of the Partners with regard to the subject matter hereof are contained herein, in the Exhibits hereto, and the documents referred
to herein, or executed herewith (collectively the "Instruments").
No other agreements, covenants, representations, or warranties,
express or implied, oral or written, have been made by any
Partner to any other with respect to the subject matter of this
Agreement.

All prior and contemporaneous conversations, negotia-

tions, possible and alleged agreements and representations,
covenants and warranties with respect to the subject matter
hereof are waived, merged, ana superseded by this Agreement and
the other Instruments.
Section 26.6

This is an integrated agreement.

No Brokers.

Each Partner represents to each

of the other Partners that there is no brokerage, fmcer's, or
other similar fees or commissions payable by virtue of the
execution of this Agreement or the consummation of the
transaction contemplated hereby.
Section 26.7

Incarceration.

The parties hereoy recognize

the General Partner's control provisions described in Paragraph
12 of the Option to Purchase Real Property excuted between Price
Development Company arc Prince Street Partnership
(predecessor-m-mterest to Armand L. Smith) . Therefore the
provisions of such Paragraph 12 (as contained in the First
Amendment to Option to Purchase Real Property dated Auaust 1,
1982) are hereby incorporated herein.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement
of Limited Partnership as of the day and year first above written.
Any individual signing this Agreement on behalf of any entity
hereby represents and warrants that he/she is duly authorized to
sign for, and bind, such entity.
GENERAL PARTNER:
PRICE DEVELOPMENT. COMPANY
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Partrership A^.eement

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

jo*
Ji
,
,
On the __/
, 1)984, personally
r day of f/tf/W/HkiCK..
appeared before m e * )?\hn
rS.o<LX .
as / ~ V n//Y/_^ Y~
of
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ana the said
i\ofl*i f^^^tjL^.
acknowledged to me that said
instrument was signed m behalf of said corporation by authority
of its by-laws (or by resolution of the board of directors) and"
said ~Joksl P\ i. o r
, acknowledged to me that said
corporation executed the same.

Residing at Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On the
f ^
day of 7Z#,*-£/K. K2L\J , 1984, personally
appeared before m e JOHN PRICE, President of Price Development
Company, the signer of the above certificate, who duly
acknowledged to m e that he executed the same.
i)
R e s i d i n g a t S a l t Lake County
My Comniission E x p i r e s :

?'^W
S'iATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF CURRY

)
:ss.
)

On the
24th
day of November
, 1984, personally
appeared before me ARMAND L. SMITH, the signer of the above
certificate, who duly acknolwedgea to me that he executed the

Residing a t : Clovis, NM
My Commission Expires:
11/14/88
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY O F SALT LAKE

: ss,
)

day of
y/l/rr^yi-htU
,H84,
persona;
On the _ /
day
J
l/rr^LSYLh&O
^ 8 4 f personally
appeared before me (Xr\
of N
INVESTMENT COFPMY;
-_P __.
—-fttfi, the signer of t h e above c e r t i n c a t e ,
who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed the same.

M£^

// J Ufa L'utJ)

Residirlg in Salt: Lake County
My Commission Expires:
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EXHIBIT A

A PORTION OF THE SW 1/4
SECTION 5, T 2 N . , R.36E., N.M.PM.
CITY OF CLOVIS
CURRY COUNTY
NEW MEXICO
BEGINNING at a point on the \ Section Line, said point being in the Scutn
Right-of-Way of Marvin Mass Boulevard and from whence the west H corner
of said Section 5 bears S89°58»00,,W 240. 00'; THENCE N89°58 , 00"E along
the South Right-of-Way of Marvin HabS Boulevard a distance of 767.31';
THENCE along an arc of a curve to the right having a radius of 265.11'
a central angle of 59°58 , 06" a distance of 277.48' said arc at curve
being along the Westerly Right-of-Way of Marvin Hass Boulevard; THENCE
S30°03'54"E along the Westerly Right-of-Way of Marvin Hass Boulevard a
distance of 1010.17'f THFNCE S89°57 , 00 M W along the North line of a
dedicated alley a distance of 597,24 r to a point in the West Right-of-Way
of Eastridge Drive; THENCE S0°12 , 23"W along the West Right-of-Way cf
Eastridge Drive a distance of 90. 00 ' ;~ THENCE S89°59 , 15"W along the nortr.
line of a dedicated alley a distance of 910.00'; THENCE N0°14 , 24"E a
distance of 130,00'; THENCE SB9°59'15''W a distance of 200.00' to a point
in the East Right-of-Way of North Prxnce Street; THENCE N O 14'24',c alone
the East Right-of -Way of North Prince Street a distance of 786.75'; THi:r',CI
N89°58*0Q"E along a line parallel to the South Right-of-way of Marvin Has?
Boulevard a distance of 200.00'; THENCE NO 14'24"E along a line parallel
to the East Right-of-Way of North Prince Street a distance of 180.00' to
point of beginning, and CONTAINING 33,465 ACRTS more or less.
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